

Let me say a few words at this juncture regarding the actual state of the land forces of Japan.

My Government have so far on their own initiative effected a substantial reduction of their military forces. Before the World War, our land forces consisted of 21 divisions besides independent formations. The Japanese Government proceeded in 1922 to reduce the effectives of each division and further in 1925 to suppress four divisions. In consequence, our military strength now consists of seventeen divisions representing about 65% of the pre-war formations.

Now that the question of naval disarmament has entered on a phase of practical solution, together with the fact that various problems regarding land and aerial disarmament have been studied at length by the Preparatory Commission of Disarmament, my country awaits in a spirit of good will the moment in the near future when the time will be ripe to envisage, under the auspices of the League of Nations, the whole problem of disarmament in all its branches.

第二部 各國政府及全權ノ公表文、聲明並覺書

(1) 昭和四年六月十六日「フ・レンス」ニ於ケル「ドーゼ」「マクドナルド」

會談ニ關スル聲明

COMMUNIQUE

We have had a conversation regarding the present position of the question of naval disarmament as between the United States and Great Britain. It has been informal and general and most satisfactory. His Excellency proposes to refer to this subjects at the Pilgrims' Dinner on Tuesday night, and I shall do the same almost at the same time at Lossiemouth. This is intended to be the beginning of the negotiations. We both wish to make it clear that the other Naval Powers are expected to cooperate in these negotiations, upon the successful consummation of which the peace of the whole world must depend.

(2) 昭和四年七月二十四日英國下院ニ於ケル「マクドナルド」ノ
建艦延期聲明

PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENT.

(July 24, 1929.)

I am now in a position to make a statement of the immediate intentions of the Government regarding the Naval building programme. The Government's general position is that the defence of a country must be devised with two main considerations in view: First, the chances of the defences having to be used; then, the efficiency and economy shown in their magnitude and character. The Government have kept in view the changes in policy and in the problem of national security effected by the Peace Pact, if that Pact is to be made a effective influence in international relations. To make it so is the controlling purpose of the Government, and a systematic policy is being developed, which will take a little time to complete, to carry out that intention.

As is well known, in the midst of the multifarious concerns which the formation of a new Government entails and the specially pressing and complicated nature of our tasks, conversations have been actively carried on between the United States and ourselves for the purpose of opening the way for an agreement on naval matters which hitherto have defied a settlement. By a happy coincidence our assumption of office corresponded in time with the arrival in this country of the new American Ambassador, General Daves, who has come here charged by the President of the United States of America with a mission for preparing the ground for an International Agreement on the Reduction and Limitation of Naval Armaments. Already the whole field of these differences with the United States has been surveyed, and the two Governments have made a fresh start on their solution. We have agreed upon the principle of parity; we have agreed that, without in any way departing from the conditions of parity, a measure of elasticity can be allowed so as to meet the peace requirements of the two nations. We have determined that we shall not allow technical points to override the great public issues involved in our being able to come to a settlement. And so soon as the rising of this House

releases me from its day-to-day work, I propose to make this matter my chief concern until an issue is reached. A visit to the President of the United States is now the subject of conversation so that it may take place when it will be most helpful to promote the cordial relations of our two countries, and in particular advance the ends of disarmament and peace which we hold in common. It has to be fitted in with certain international conferences, but October at present looks a likely month.

A Committee to co-ordinate the three Services for the purposes of Cabinet consideration has been set up, but as that co-ordination is not comprehensive enough to meet the requirements of State policy, the Foreign Office is also represented upon it. This will enable us to systematise our work. In the opinion of this Committee, the general outlook is such as to justify a review of our own programme. Our predecessors did this from time to time as the outlook brightened. Therefore, after a thorough examination of our naval position, and not only as a proof of our own sincerity but as a duty imposed upon us to guard the expenditure of national money, we have decided as follows:

To suspend all work on the cruisers "Surrey" and "Northumberland."

To cancel the Submarine Depot Ship "Maidstone."

To cancel two contract submarines.

To slow down dockyard work on other naval construction.

As regards the 1920-30 programme, in any event no commitments would have to be entered into before the autumn, and no steps will be taken to proceed with it until the matter has received further consideration.

The Government, of course, recognises that a reduction in the Naval building programme must have a direct effect on employment in the dockyards, but I am glad to say that as a result of special rearrangements suggested by the Admiralty, it is hoped to be able to secure the absorption of a large amount of labour which would otherwise be discharged from the Royal Dockyards. The representatives of dockyard labour will at once be consulted.

We are indebted to the Board of Admiralty for the help which they have rendered, and I desire to state that, having expressed their technical view on the minimum armaments they consider to be necessary, they have furnished us with loyal help in achieving our object with the least possible dislocation and hardship.

I ought to add, in order to make the statement complete, that it is recognised by all the Powers concerned that

a preliminary agreement on Anglo-American differences is essential to a general agreement on naval building, and the Governments of the Powers represented at Washington, 1921-22, have been informed of the conversations. So soon as the way is cleared, they will be invited to a preliminary Conference so that we may all together try to come to an agreement of a comprehensive kind. The final agreement would be ratified at a place which, I hope, will by common consent be chosen by the United States as a recognition of the splendid part played by its President in these transactions, and then reported to the Preparatory Commission of the League as a contribution to its work.

If these intentions are fulfilled, the request of the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament made at Geneva on 15th March, 1928, that the Powers should make an attempt to agree amongst themselves will be accomplished, and we shall be in a position to pursue with that Commission the difficult but essential problems of how to reduce other forms of armaments in accordance with the pledge given by the Allies at Versailles when imposing disarmament on Germany and its associated nations, and in pursuance of the Pact of Peace. To that His Majesty's Government will direct their thoughts and their energies, in cooperation with other nations, so soon as this more immediate work on naval agreement has been finished. A general Disarmament Conference will then be possible. I am anxious that the House should not minimise the difficulties in our way, nor the time that will be required for the negotiations, but they may be assured that it will be our care to make our own policy clear and our desire to put our energies into a settlement without unnecessary delay.

(3) 昭和四年七月二十四日「ノーヴェー」ノ建艦延期聲明

PRESIDENT HOOVER'S STATEMENT (JULY 24, 1929.)

I have read with real satisfaction the statement which the Prime Minister has made in the House of Commons. The American people are greatly complimented by his proposed visit and he will find a universal welcome.

Mr. MacDonald's statement marks a new departure in discussion of naval disarmament. The Prime Minister introduces the principle of parity which we have now adopted and its consummation means that Great Britain and the United States henceforth are not to compete in armament as potential opponents but to cooperate as friends in the reduction of it. The Prime Minister has stated clearly and unmistakable the principles on which he is acting. I cannot but be responsive to the generous terms in which he has spoken of the attitude and purpose of the United States. We join in his efforts in the same spirit.

Mr. MacDonald has indicated the good will and positive intention of the British government by suspension of construction of certain portions of this year's British Naval program. It is the desire of the United States to show equal good will in our approach to the problem.

We have three cruisers in this year's construction program which have been undertaken in the Government Navy Yards, the detailed drawings for which are now in course of preparation. The actual keels would, in the ordinary course, be laid down some time this fall. Generally speaking, the British cruiser strength considerably exceeds American strength at the present time and the actual construction of these three cruisers would not be likely in themselves to produce inequality in the final result.

We do not wish, however, to have any misunderstanding of our actions and therefore we shall not lay these keels until there has been an opportunity for full consideration of their effect upon the final agreement for parity which we expect to reach, although our hopes of relief from construction lie more largely in the latter years of the program under the law of 1928.

(4) 昭和四年十月七日附英國政府ノ倫敦會議招請狀 (第二部)(3)(4圖1)

(5) 昭和四年十月九日發表ノ英米共同聲明

TO BE RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THURSDAY MORNING
PAPERS OCTOBER 10, 1929.

The visit of the British Prime Minister to President Hoover, which is now terminated, had as its chief purpose the making of personal contacts which will be fruitful in promoting friendly and frank relations between the two countries. Both the President and the Prime Minister are highly gratified by the keen interest which the people of both countries have taken in the meeting, and regard it as proof of the strong desire of both nations to come to closer understanding. The British Prime Minister has been particularly impressed and gratified by the warmth of his welcome and the flood of expressions of good will which have poured upon him.

At the moment of leaving Washington the following joint statement was issued:

"During the last few days we have had an opportunity, in the informal talks in which we have engaged, not only to review the conversations on a naval agreement which have been carried on during this summer between us, but also to discuss some of the more important means by which the moral force of our countries can be exerted for peace.

"We have been guided by the double hope of settling our own differences on naval matters and so establishing unclouded good will, candor and confidence between us, and also of contributing something to the solution of the problem of peace in which all other nations are interested and which calls for their cooperation.

"In signing the Paris Peace Pact fifty-six nations have declared that war shall not be used as an instrument of national policy. We have agreed that all disputes shall be settled by pacific means. Both our Governments resolve to accept the Peace Pact not only as a declaration of good intentions but as a positive obligation to direct national policy in accordance with its pledge.

"The part of each of our government in the promotion of world peace will be different, as one will never consent to become entangled in European diplomacy and the other is resolved to pursue a policy of active cooperation with its European neighbours; but each of our governments will direct its thoughts and influence towards securing and maintaining the peace of the world.

"Our conversations have been largely confined to the mutual relations of the two countries in the light of the situation created by the signing of the Peace Pact. Therefore, in a new and reinforced sense the two governments not only declare that war between them is unthinkable, but that distrusts and suspicions arising from doubts and fears which may have been justified before the Peace Pact must now cease to influence national policy. We approach old historical problems from a new angle and in a new atmosphere. On the assumption that war between us is banished, and that conflicts between our military or naval forces cannot take place, these problems have changed their meaning and character, and their solution, in ways satisfactory to both countries, has become possible.

"We have agreed that those questions should become the subject of active consideration between us. They involve important technical matters requiring detailed study. One of the hopeful results of the visit which is now terminating officially has been that our two Governments will begin conversations upon them following the same method as that which has been pursued during the summer in London.

"The exchange of views on naval reduction has brought the two nations so close to agreement that the obstacles in previous conferences arising out of Anglo-American disagreements seem now substantially removed. We have kept the nations which took part in the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 informed of the progress of our conversations, and we have now proposed to them that we should all meet together and try to come to common agreement which would justify each in making substantial naval reductions. An agreement on naval armaments cannot be completed without the cooperation of other naval powers, and both of us feel sure that, by the same free and candid discussion of needs which has characterized our conversations, such mutual understandings will be reached as will make naval agreement next January possible, and thus remove this serious obstacle to the progress of world disarmament.

“Between now and the meeting of the proposed conference in January, our Governments will continue conversations with the other powers concerned, in order to remove as many difficulties as possible before the official and formal negotiations open.

“In view of the security afforded by the Peace Pact, we have been able to end, we trust for ever, all competitive building between ourselves with the risk of war and the waste of public money involved, by agreeing to a parity of fleets, category by category.

“Success at the coming conference will result in a large decrease in the naval equipment of the world and, what is equally important, the reduction of prospective programs of construction which would otherwise produce competitive building to an indefinite amount.

“We hope and believe that the steps we have taken will be warmly welcomed by the people whom we represent as a substantial contribution to the efforts universally made by all nations to gain security for peace—not by military organization—but by peaceful means rooted in public opinion and enforced by a sense of justice in the civilized world.”

(6) 會議招請ニ對スル昭和四年十月十日附米國政府ノ回答

TEXT OF AMERICAN NOTE ACCEPTING LONDON CONFERENCE INVITATION.

Oct. 10, 1929.

I have the honor to refer to the Note which you were good enough to address to the American Ambassador on Oct. 7, and I take great pleasure in informing you that the American Government hastens to accept the invitation of his Majesty's Government to a conference on naval armaments, to take place in London the latter part of January, which will unite the powers signatory to the Washington Treaty in a discussion which will anticipate the problems raised under Article 21 of that Treaty, as well as broaden its whole scope by the inclusion of the other categories of ships.

(Signed) RAY ATHERTON.
Chargé d'Affaires.

(7) 會議招請ニ對スル昭和四年十月十四日伊國政府回答

Il Governo Italiano ha preso nella più seria considerazione la Nota del 7 corrente con la quale il Segretario di Stato per gli Affari Esteri, dopo aver portato a conoscenza del Governo Italiano i punti sui quali un accordo provvisorio e non formale è stato raggiunto fra il Governo Britannico ed il Governo degli Stati Uniti nel corso delle loro conversazioni sul disarmo navale, ha proposto al Regio Governo di partecipare ad una Conferenza da tenersi a Londra al principio della terza settimana del prossimo gennaio per esaminare le categorie di navi non contemplate dal Trattato di Washington del 1922 e par trattare le questioni di cui al secondo paragrafo dell'art° 21 del Trattato stesso. Tale Conferenza, all quale vengono invitate le Potenze firmatarie del Trattato di Washington, dovrebbe mirare alla elaborazione di un testo atto a facilitare il compito della Commissione Preparatoria della Società delle Nazioni e successivamente della Conferenza Generale del Disarmo.

Il pensiero del Governo Italiano sul problema del disarmo in generale e del disarmo navale in particolare è troppo noto al Governo Britannico perchè occorran nuove dichiarazioni in proposito. Tale pensiero è stato chiaramente espresso in ripetute occasioni e da ultimo nella Nota Verbale indirizzata il 6 Ottobre 1928 alla Ambasciata di Sua Maestà Britannica in Roma, in risposta alla comunicazione relativa al progetto di accordo navale franco-britannico dello scorso anno. Desideroso come sempre di collaborare in qualsiasi azione che si proponga di eliminare i danni ed i pericoli degli eccessivi armamenti, e nutrendo la speranza che la iniziativa britannica possa avere come risultato un reale progresso verso la soluzione del problema generale del disarmo, il Governo Italiano è lieto di accettare l'invito del Governo Britannico a partecipare alla Conferenza di Londra.

Il Governo Italiano prende atto del proposito manifestato del Governo Britannico di comunicargli le proprie vedute circa gli argomentanti da discutersi alla Conferenza, e mentre resta in attesa di tali comunicazioni, si riserva di far conoscere a sua volta al Governo Britannico il proprio modo di vedere al riguardo.

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(右譯文)

伊國政府ハ貴國外務大臣カ英米兩國政府ノ海軍縮少ニ關スル交渉中ニ兩國政府間ニ成立シタル暫定的且非公式ナル合意ヲ見タル諸點ヲ通報セラレタル後千九百二十二年「ワシントン」條約ニ包含セラレサル艦種ニ付考究ヲ加ヘ且同條約第二十一條第二項ニ關スル諸問題ヲ處理スル爲一月第三週初頭ヨリ「ロンドン」ニ於テ開催セラルヘキ會議ニ伊國政府ノ參加セシコトヲ招請セラレタル十月七日附書翰ヲ諒承シ之ヲ慎重考慮セリ

同會議ニ於テハ「ワシントン」條約署名國ヲ招請スヘキカ國際聯盟軍縮準備委員會及次イテ軍縮本會議ノ事業ヲ促進スヘキ一規定ヲ創案スルニ至ルヘキモノナリ

一般軍縮及特ニ海軍縮少問題ニ關スル伊國政府ノ意嚮ハ英國政府ノ熟知セラルヲ以テ之ニ關シ新ナル聲明ヲ必要トセサルヘシ伊國政府ノ意嚮ハ屢次ニ互リ明示セラレ最近ニ於テハ千九百二十八年十月六日附在「ローマ」英國大使宛客年英國海軍協定案ニ關スル通牒ニ對スル回答中ニ之ヲ明言シタリ

伊國政府ハ過度ノ軍備ノ齎ス損害危険ヲ除去セントスル一切ノ企圖ニハ常ニ協力センコトヲ欲シ又英國ノ提唱ノ結果一般軍縮問題解決ニ一步ヲ進メ得ヘキコトヲ希望スルモノナルヲ以テ英國政府ノ「ロンドン」會議參加招請ヲ欣然受諾スルモノナリ

伊國政府ハ英國政府カ同會議ニ依リテ討議セラルヘキ議題ニ關シ伊國側ノ見解ヲ通報スルヲ求メラレタルニ對シ之ヲ諒承シ英國側ノ同様ノ通報ニ接センコトヲ期待シ其ノ都度伊國側ノ見解ヲ回示スヘキコトヲ留保スルモノナリ

(参考) 佛譯文)

“Le gouvernement italien a pris dans la plus sérieuse considération la note du 7 octobre par laquelle le Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires étrangères, après avoir porté à la connaissance du gouvernement italien les points sur lesquels un accord provisoire et non formel s'est établi entre le gouvernement britannique et le gouvernement des Etats-Unis au cours de leurs conversations sur le désarmement naval, a proposé au R. Gouvernement de participer à une Conférence devant être tenue à Londres au commencement de la troisième semaine de janvier pour examiner les catégories de navires non comprises dans le Traité de Washington de 1922 et pour traiter les questions relatives au second paragraphe de l'art. 21 du Traité. Cette Conférence à laquelle sont invitées les puissances signataires du Traité de Washington devrait tendre à l'élaboration d'un texte apte à faciliter la tâche de la Commission préparatoire de la S. d. N. et successivement de la Conférence générale du désarmement.

La pensée du gouvernement sur le problème du désarmement général et du désarmement naval en particulier est trop connue du gouvernement britannique pour que de nouvelles déclarations soient nécessaires à ce propos.

Cette pensée a été clairement exprimée à plusieurs reprises et en dernier lieu dans la note verbale adressée le 6 octobre 1928 à l'Ambassade de S. M. Britannique à Rome, en réponse à la communication relative au projet d'accord naval britannique de l'an dernier.

Désireux, comme toujours, de collaborer à toute action qui se propose d'éliminer les dommages et les dangers des excessifs armements, et nourrissant l'espoir que l'initiative britannique puisse avoir comme résultat un réel progrès vers la solution du problème général du désarmement, le gouvernement italien est heureux d'accepter l'invitation du gouvernement britannique à participer à la Conférence de Londres.

Le gouvernement italien prend acte de l'intention manifestée par le gouvernement britannique de lui communiquer ses propres vues sur les arguments à discuter par la Conférence et, dans l'attente de ces communications, se réserve de faire connaître à son tour au gouvernement britannique son propre point de vue à cet égard.”

(8) 會議招請ニ對スル昭和四年十月十六日附帝國政府ノ回答

(英) 編(ハ) (一四四一)

(9) 會議招請ニ對スル昭和四年十月十六日佛國政府ノ回答

“Le Gouvernement Français a pris connaissance avec un vif intérêt de la lettre du Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères par laquelle le Gouvernement Britannique, en lui communiquant les principes qui ont fait l'objet d'un accord provisoire entre lui et le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, l'invite à se faire représenter à une Conférence qui s'ouvrirait à Londres au début de la troisième semaine du mois de Janvier prochain, et où seraient discutés les problèmes relatifs aux catégories de bâtiments de guerre qui ne sont pas visés dans le Traité de Washington de 1922, ainsi que les questions faisant l'objet du deuxième paragraphe de l'art. 21 de ce traité.

Le Gouvernement de la République se félicite que les conversations engagées entre le Premier Ministre Britannique et l'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Londres, suivant la méthode suggérée au cours des délibérations de la Commission préparatoire du désarmement, aient pris un tour aussi favorable; il n'a pas été moins heureux de constater que les deux Gouvernements ont trouvé dans le Pacte de Paris du 27 Août 1928 un élément précieux pour réaliser entre eux une entente de principe sur les armements navals qui leur paraissent répondre aux besoins de leur sécurité.

Le Gouvernement Britannique, après s'être concerté avec le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, propose maintenant d'étendre ces conversations aux Puissances qui paraissent principalement intéressées à la solution du problème naval, et cette initiative a expressément pur but, ainsi que le marque la communication du Secrétaire d'Etat, de faciliter la tâche de la Commission préparatoire et celle de la future conférence générale pour la limitation et la réduction des armements.

Le Gouvernement Français a donné trop de preuves de son désir de voir le prompt achèvement des travaux préparatoires de cette Conférence dont la réunion permettra de réaliser les obligations inscrites à l'article 8 du Pacte de la Société des Nations, pour ne pas se féliciter d'une telle proposition: il est donc heureux d'accepter l'invitation qui lui est adressée.

Les principes qui n'ont pas cessé de guider la politique française, soit en ce qui concerne les conditions générales du problème de la limitation des armements, soit au sujet des conditions spéciales du problème de la limitation des armements navals, ont été trop souvent définis, aussi bien au cours des travaux de Genève que dans les négociations connexes, pour qu'il soit nécessaire de les rappeler.

D'ailleurs le Secrétaire d'Etat britannique pour les Affaires Etrangères, dans la lettre précitée, fait connaître l'intention de son Gouvernement de procéder avec le Gouvernement Français, comme avec les autres Gouvernements invités à la Conférence de Londres, à des échanges de vues préliminaires sur les questions qui seront inscrites au programme de leur délibération commune: le Gouvernement de la République ne voit que des avantages à l'application d'une telle méthode, qui lui fournira l'occasion de préciser sa manière de voir, tant en ce qui concerne les divers points visés dans la lettre de S. Exc. M. Arthur Henderson, que sur les problèmes qui s'y rattachent et sur l'ensemble des questions qui pourront se poser devant la prochaine Conférence."

(右譯文)

英國政府ハ同國外務大臣ノ書翰ヲ以テ英國政府及米國政府間暫定協定ノ主題タリシ原則ヲ佛國政府ニ通報セラルルト共ニ來ル一月第三週初頭ニ「ロンドン」ニ於テ開催セラレ千九百二十二年ノ「ワシントン」條約ニ規定セラレタル艦種ニ關スル問題竝同條約第二十一條第二項ノ主題タル問題ヲ討議スヘキ會議ニ佛國政府ノ參加ヲ招請セラレタル佛國政府ハ右書翰ヲ深甚ナル興味ヲ以テ了承ス

佛國政府ハ軍備縮少準備委員會ニ於ケル討議中提議セラレタル方法ニ從ヒ英國首相及在「ロンドン」米國大使間ニ行ハレタル會談カスノ如ク好轉スルニ至リタルヲ慶賀シ又兩國政府カ其ノ國ノ安全ノ必要ヲ充タスニ足ルト思考スル海軍軍備ニ付相互間ニ原則上ノ協定ヲ遂クルニ當リ千九百二十八年八月二十七日ノ「バリ」條約ヲ以テ之カ貴重ナル要素ト看做シタルコトヲ知リ大ニ欣幸トスルモノナリ今ヤ英國政府ハ米國政府ト協議ノ上海軍問題ノ解決ニ付主要ナル利害關係ヲ有スト

思考セラルル國ニ對シ右會談ノ範圍ヲ擴張センコトヲ提議セラレタルカ右提議ノ目的カ明カニ準備委員會並將來ノ軍備制限及縮少ニ關スル一般會議ノ事業ヲ容易ナラシムルニアルコトハ英國外務大臣ノ書翰中ニ指摘セラレタル通ナリ

該會議ノ開催ニ依リ國際聯盟規約第八條ニ規定セル義務ヲ實行シ得ヘキニ依リ佛國政府ハ該會議準備事業ノ急速終結ヲ希望スルノ證左ヲ示シ來リタル次第ナルヲ以テ此ノ種ノ提案ヲ見ルハ其ノ慶賀ニ堪ヘサル所ナリ仍テ佛國政府ハ茲ニ同政府ニ對スル招請ヲ受諾スルヲ欣幸トスルモノナリ

軍備制限問題ノ一般條件並海軍軍備制限問題ノ特殊條件ニ關シ佛國ノ政策ヲ終始指導セル主義ハ「ジュネーヴ」ノ討議及之ニ關聯セル交渉ニ際シテ屢々言明セル所ナルヲ以テ茲ニ之ヲ再言スルノ要無カルヘシ

尙英國外務大臣ハ前記書翰中ニ於テ共同討議ノ議題トスヘキ問題ニ關シ英國政府ハ「ロンドン」會議ニ招請セラレタル他國政府ト同様ニ佛國政府ト豫備的意見交換ヲ爲ス意向ヲ有スル旨ヲ述ヘラレタル佛國政府ハ斯クノ如キ方法ニ依ルコトハ「アーサー、ヘンダスン」閣下ノ書翰中ニ舉ケラレタル諸點竝右ニ附帶スル問題及來ルヘキ會議ニ附議セラレ得ヘキ問題ノ全般ニ對シ佛國政府ノ見解ヲ明ニスル機會ヲ得ヘキ所以ナルヲ以テ之ヲ有益ト思考スルモノナリ

(10) 昭和四年十二月二十日附佛國政府覺書

本覺書ハ會議ニ附議セラレヘキ問題全般ニ對シテ佛國政府ノ見解ヲ述ビタルモノナリ
茲ニ採録セラルル在佛帝國大使館宛佛國外務省ヨリ送付セラレタルモノナリ

Ministère
des
Affaires Étrangères

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Direction
des
Affaires politiques et
commerciales

Paris, le 20 décembre 1929

Service Français
de la
Société des Nations.

avenue Tourville 2 A

Ainsi que le sait l'Ambassade Impériale du Japon, en acceptant à la date du 16 octobre dernier, de participer à la Conférence Navale de Londres convoquée par le Gouvernement britannique, le Gouvernement de la République avait indiqué dans sa réponse qu'il réserverait pour les échanges de vues préliminaires à cette réunion, l'exposé de sa manière de voir sur les questions qui pourront se poser devant elle.

Le ministère des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de communiquer sous ce pli à l'Ambassade Impériale du Japon le texte d'un Mémoire que l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres vient de remettre au Gouvernement britannique en vue de préciser la position du Gouvernement français sur certaines de ces questions.

Paris, le 20 décembre 1929.

Ambassade Impériale du Japon
à Paris.

MEMORANDUM.

En acceptant, le 16 Octobre l'invitation du Gouvernement britannique de participer à la Conférence Navale de Londres, le Gouvernement français s'était réservé de préciser sa manière de voir sur les problèmes qui seront inscrits au programme des délibérations et sur l'ensemble des questions qui pourront se poser devant cette réunion internationale. Après les échanges de vues qui ont déjà eu lieu, le moment lui paraît venu de définir son attitude sur des questions essentielles de principe et de méthode qui se présenteront au cours de la négociation et dont l'importance, débordant du cadre technique, mérite d'être mise en pleine lumière.

I.

Le Gouvernement de la République a déjà eu l'occasion de marquer combien il appréciait les préoccupations qui avaient inspiré l'initiative du Gouvernement britannique, d'accord avec le Gouvernement américain. Il mesure trop bien le caractère essentiel de l'œuvre de limitation des armements : il a pris aux travaux poursuivis jusqu'ici dans ce sens une part trop active pour ne s'être pas félicité d'une proposition qui tendait, comme l'a dit expressément Son Excellence Monsieur Henderson dans sa lettre du 7 Octobre, à faciliter la tâche de la Commission Préparatoire de la Société des Nations et, ultérieurement, celle de la Conférence générale du désarmement.

C'est d'ailleurs le problème du désarmement naval qui, depuis la réunion tenue aux mois d'avril et de mai derniers par la Commission Préparatoire de Genève, doit être considéré comme faisant encore obstacle à la conclusion des travaux que cette Commission a poursuivis avec la collaboration efficace de délégués américains. Aussi bien, la dernière Assemblée de la Société des Nations a-t-elle proclamé qu'un accord entre les principales Puissances navales était nécessaire pour préparer une entente générale sur les méthodes à appliquer en matière de réduction des armements navals ; les conversations qui étaient déjà en cours lui sont en effet apparues comme devant permettre la reprise et l'achèvement des travaux interrompus de la Commission Préparatoire, puis, ultérieurement, la convocation de la Conférence générale.

C'est donc d'abord sur des principes et des méthodes rendant possible la conclusion ultérieure d'une Convention

générale de limitation des armements que, de l'avis du Gouvernement français, il convient que les Puissances réunies à Londres se mettent d'accord.

Le Gouvernement britannique a fait connaître que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis et lui avaient pris comme base de leurs conversations le Pacte de Paris. Le Gouvernement de la République, qui a déjà eu l'occasion de manifester avec quelle satisfaction il avait accueilli cette déclaration, a pris à la préparation de ce Pacte une trop grande part pour qu'il soit nécessaire de dire l'importance qu'il lui reconnaît. Le Pacte de Paris est fondé sur la force de l'opinion publique, qui est grande; mais son application méthodique n'a pas encore été organisée; il ne règle pas toutes les questions de procédure pacifique, d'assistance mutuelle contre l'agresseur qu'implique la mise de la guerre hors la loi. Certes, il constitue un réel progrès au point de vue du maintien de la paix, mais on ne peut pas dire qu'il suffise, dans son état actuel, pour garantir la sécurité des nations.

Sans doute, est-ce cette considération qui a empêché le Gouvernement britannique d'envisager une réduction sensible de ses armements navals, et le Gouvernement américain de renoncer à l'exécution rapide de son dernier programme naval. Bien que l'un et l'autre aient été d'accord pour exclure entre eux toute possibilité de conflit, ils ont été obligés de considérer que leurs marines avaient comme tâche essentielle d'assurer la protection de leurs communications, ce qui semble ne pas exclure une hypothèse où elles seraient amenées à intervenir dans un conflit né de la violation d'engagements solennels.

Quelle que soit l'importance reconnue au Pacte de Paris, c'est essentiellement sur le Pacte de la Société des Nations que le Gouvernement français comme les autres Gouvernements Membres de la Société, s'est engagé à fonder la limitation et la réduction de ses armements, dont les armements navals ne sont qu'une partie. Si incomplètes que soient encore les mesures prises pour en assurer la mise en oeuvre, ce Pacte fournit dès maintenant les bases d'un système complet de sécurité fondé sur l'application de méthodes de règlement pacifique, et d'aide à l'Etat injustement attaqué. Ce n'est qu'en fonction de l'aide extérieure sur laquelle elles pourront compter que les Nations seront en mesure de réduire effectivement leurs armements. Tant il est vrai qu'un accord technique général sur les armements suppose un accord politique préalable; tant il est vrai, en particulier, qu'un accord naval complet suppose un accord sur la question de la

liberté des mers définissant les droits des belligérants et ceux des neutres, et prévoyant la collaboration éventuelle des autres flottes contre celle d'un pays agresseur.

Quelque regret qu'il puisse éprouver de cette situation, le Gouvernement de la République n'en est pas moins décidé à apporter tout son concours aux Puissances réunies à Londres, pour faire aboutir les solutions répondant aux possibilités du moment.

* * *

La question de méthodes n'est pas moins importante. Suivant l'exemple de la Conférence de Washington, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis et le Gouvernement britannique semblent avoir envisagé l'adoption d'une méthode d'évaluation des armements navals ne portant que sur les armements des cinq Marines numériquement les plus fortes et fondée sur des barèmes mathématiques.

L'exemple de la Conférence navale de Rome est là cependant pour rappeler que les principes du Traité de Washington ont été mis en échec lorsque la Société des Nations essaya, en 1924, de les étendre à toutes les Marines; et la preuve a souvent été faite à Genève que des barèmes ne permettaient pas une application rationnelle et valable pour tous les Etats, des principes définis à l'article 8 du Pacte qui prévoit une réduction générale des armements au minimum compatible avec la sécurité de chaque Etat et avec les obligations internationales que lui imposerait une action commune, en tenant compte de sa situation géographique et de ses conditions spéciales.

Or, la Conférence n'aura complètement atteint son but que si elle rend possible, à Genève, un accord général sur les méthodes de limitation des armements navals.

II.

Ces observations générales étaient nécessaires pour préciser les principes dont s'inspirera le Gouvernement français au cours des négociations de Londres.

1°) C'est sur l'article 8 du Pacte que le Gouvernement de la République, fidèle à sa signature, entend fonder la réduction de ses armements. C'est en effet sur cette base seule, qui ne comporte pas l'application a priori de formules

mathématiques, et sur laquelle la Commission Préparatoire du Désarmement a déjà fondé ses travaux, que peut, à son avis, être préparé un accord acceptable pour les Gouvernements qui ne seront pas représentés à Londres.

Dans le cadre de l'article 8, deux méthodes se sont opposées à Genève, pour la limitation des armements navals; l'une par le tonnage global; l'autre par catégorie de bâtiments. Vers la seconde penchaient les Marines les plus fortes, alors que les autres se prononçaient toutes pour la première.

Soucieuse de faciliter la conciliation des points de vue ainsi opposés, la Délégation française avait proposé dès le mois d'avril 1927, un système transactionnel qui fut favorablement accueilli par toutes les marines qui ne seront pas représentées à Londres, et envisagé avec sympathie par plusieurs autres. En particulier, le Gouvernement américain a eu, par deux fois, l'occasion de faire connaître publiquement qu'il était disposé à l'accepter comme base de discussion. Ce système consistait à compléter la limitation des flottes par le tonnage global, en publiant la répartition de ce tonnage entre les principales classes de navires et en réglementant le transfert de tonnage d'une classe dans l'autre.

Un tel système, d'ailleurs susceptible d'aménagements de détail, peut d'autant mieux s'adapter aux nécessités de l'attente envisagée entre les Gouvernements américain et britannique, qu'il laisse aux Etats qui le désiraient toute possibilité pour se lier entre eux plus étroitement. Malgré ses préférences pour le système de limitation par le tonnage global, le Gouvernement de la République demeure prêt à se rallier à cette méthode transactionnelle si elle permet de réaliser l'accord général.

2°)-Les travaux préparatoires de Genève ont établi qu'il existait une étroite interdépendance, dans l'ensemble des armements de défense d'un pays, entre ses forces terrestres, navales et aéronautiques. Le Gouvernement français a eu maintes fois l'occasion de déclarer qu'il y avait là un principe fondamental de sa politique de défense nationale, dont l'importance résulte notamment de la situation géographique de la France, puissance à la fois continentale et maritime, métropole d'un empire colonial réparti sur toute la surface du globe.

Le Gouvernement de la République ne souhaite pas se voir dans l'obligation d'évoquer à Londres des questions relatives à la fixation des armements terrestres et aériens; mais il ne doit pas laisser ignorer que le tonnage correspondant aux besoins de sa défense navale est en relation étroite avec le niveau de ses armements terrestres et aériens,

calculés suivant les méthodes arrêtées par la Commission Préparatoire lors de sa dernière réunion. Si les décisions de celle-ci devaient être remises en question, les précisions qu'il apportera sur ses armements navals perdraient toute valeur.

Le Gouvernement français tient d'ailleurs à ajouter que ces difficultés ne l'empêcheront pas de rechercher les solutions qui permettront aux Puissances qui le désireraient, et qui estimeraient pouvoir le faire en toute sécurité, de se lier entre elles de façon définitive sans attendre la conclusion de la Convention générale de limitation de tous les armements.

3°)-Sous le bénéfice des remarques qui précèdent, la Délégation française n'aura aucune peine à faire connaître l'importance du tonnage correspondant aux besoins nationaux, en tenant compte de la situation géographique de la France sur trois mers et du développement d'un empire colonial de 11 millions de kilomètres carrés, peuplé de 60 millions d'habitants et dont le commerce atteint 32 milliards. L'existence de cet empire, l'obligation d'assurer la défense propre des grands groupements qui le constituent, les liens multiples, politiques et économiques, qui unissent ces grands groupements entre eux et à la Métropole, la nécessité de protéger l'intégrité et la vie économique de celle-ci, la mission de veiller à la sécurité de plus de 30,000 kilomètres de côtes au total, créent à la Marine française des devoirs que le Gouvernement de la République ne saurait perdre de vue lorsqu'il s'agit, pour lui, d'appliquer l'article 8 du Pacte. Le budget naval français est d'ailleurs inférieur à ce qu'il était en 1915; le même souci de stricte modération continuera à inspirer la France dans l'appréciation de ses besoins et dans l'évaluation des forces nécessaires pour les satisfaire.

A cet égard, le Gouvernement français tiendra le plus grand compte des garanties de sécurité qui pourraient être établies et qui donneraient leur plein effet aux engagements de solidarité internationale contre l'agresseur inscrits à l'article 16 du Pacte de la Société des Nations.

4°)-Par ailleurs, se souvenant de l'influence heureuse que le traité relatif au Pacifique a exercée en vue de la conclusion des accords navals de Washington, il semble au Gouvernement français que, dans un domaine limité, mais qui intéresse la plupart des Marines européennes, un progrès pourrait être réalisé. Les communications à travers la Méditerranée ont, pour l'Empire britannique, une importance que le Gouvernement de la République ne méconnaît pas. Cette importance n'est pas moindre pour la France. Est-il possible de réaliser entre les Puissances navales méditerranéennes un accord de garantie mutuelle et de non agression auquel seraient associées celles d'entre elles qui ne seront pas représentées à Londres, et d'abord une Puissance comme l'Espagne dont il n'est pas besoin de rappeler l'importance des intérêts navals en Médi-

terrancé? Le Gouvernement de la République pose la question en se déclarant favorable au principe d'un tel accord, parce qu'il a le désir sincère d'aboutir à une réduction des armements navals.

* * *

En terminant cet exposé des observations générales que lui a suggérées l'étude du programme de la Conférence, le Gouvernement de la République tient à déclarer qu'aucune des difficultés sur lesquelles il a cru devoir attirer l'attention, ne lui paraît insurmontable.

Convaincu que tous les Gouvernements qui seront réunis à Londres apporteront dans ces délibérations la même volonté, dont il est lui-même animé, de mettre en oeuvre dans une collaboration sincère les moyens permettant de triompher des obstacles, il a confiance dans le succès d'une négociation qui préparera les voies à la Conférence générale de limitation et de réduction des armements, qui seule paraît pouvoir donner satisfaction à la volonté commune des peuples d'organiser la paix.

20 Décembre 1929.

(右假譯文)

佛國政府ハ十月十六日倫敦海軍會議參加方ニ關スル英國政府ノ招請ヲ受諾スルニ際シ、討議事項ニ包含セラルヘキ問題並右國際會議ニ於テ提出セラルルコトアルヘキ問題ノ全般ニ付其ノ見解ヲ將來明確ニスル處アルヘキコトヲ留保セリ今日迄ニ行ハレタル意見ノ交換ニ鑑ミ商議中生スルコトアルヘク且技術的範圍以上ニ出テ其ノ緊切ナルコトヲ明瞭ニシ置クノ要アル原則及方式ニ關スル主要問題ニ付今ヤ其ノ態度ヲ決スヘキ秋至レリト信ス

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佛國政府ハ既ニ英國政府カ米國政府トノ合意ヲ以テ爲シタル提議ノ精神ヲ大ニ多トスル機會ヲ有シタリ佛國政府ハ軍備

制限事業ノ重要ナルヲ熟知シ居レルモノニシテ今日迄行ハレ來リシ事業ニモ右趣旨ニヨリ銳意其ノ協力ヲ致セルヲ以テ「アーサー、ヘンダーソン」閣下カ十月七日附書翰中ニ明記セラレタルカ如ク國際聯盟軍縮準備委員會及次テ軍備縮少一般會議ノ任務ヲ容易ナラシメムトスル提議ニ對シテハ大ニ欣幸ノ意ヲ表スルモノナリ

而シテ海軍縮少問題ハ壽府準備委員會ノ去ル四月及五月ノ會合以來米國委員ノ協力アルニモ拘ラス尙同委員會事業終了ノ障害ヲ爲シツツアルモノト認ムヘク因テ去ル國際聯盟總會ハ海軍軍備縮少ニ適用スヘキ方式ニ關スル一般協定ヲ作成スルニハ主要海軍國間ノ合意ヲ必要トスル旨ヲ宣明セリ。當時既ニ行ハレツツアリシ商議ヲ以テ總會ハ一時休止セラレタル準備委員會事業ノ再開及完結次テ一般會議ノ召集ヲ可能ナラシムヘキモノト認メタル次第ナリ

從テ佛國政府ハ倫敦ニ會商スヘキ諸國ハ先ツ將來軍備縮少一般條約ノ妥結ヲ可能ナラシムヘキ原則及方式ニ付合意ヲナスヲ適當ト信スルモノナリ。英國政府ハ同政府及米國政府ハ不戰條約ヲ以テ右二國政府商議ノ基礎トシタル旨ヲ通報セラレタリ。佛國政府ハ既ニ右宣明ニ對シテハ深甚ナル満足ノ意ヲ表シタル處ニシテ佛國政府カ同條約ヲ重視スルハ贅言ヲ要セサル處トス。同條約ハ強大ナル力ヲ有スル輿論ニ基礎ヲ置クモノニシテ其ノ系統的適用ハ未タ組織セラレ居ラス即平和的處理手續、戰爭違法化ニ伴フ侵略國ニ對スル相互援助ニ關スル一切ノ問題ニ付規定スル處ナシ

惟フニ同條約ハ平和保持ノ見地ヨリ顯著ナル進歩ヲ爲スモノナルハ勿論ナルモ其ノ現狀ヲ以テシテハ各國ノ安全ヲ保障スルニ足ルモノト云フヲ得ス

英國政府ヲシテ徹底的海軍縮少ヲ考慮スルコトヲ妨ケ又米國政府ヲシテ其ノ最近ノ建造計劃ノ迅速ナル實行ヲ拋棄セシムルコトヲ妨ケタルハ恐ラクハ右考慮ニ基クモノナルヘシ。右兩國政府ハイツレモ兩國間ニ紛爭ノ可能性ヲ排除シツツモ尙其ノ海軍ノ主要任務ヲ以テ自國交通路保護ニアルモノト認メサルヲ得サルモノニテ嚴肅ニ爲サレタル約定ノ違反ヨリ生スヘキ紛爭ニ關與スルニ至ルヘキ場合ヲ排除セサルモノノ如シ

不戰條約ノ價值如何ニ拘ラス佛國政府ハ他ノ聯盟國政府ト同様自國軍備—海軍軍備ハ其ノ一部ニ過キス—ノ縮少ハ主トシ

テ國際聯盟規約ニ基キテ之ヲ爲スヘキコトヲ約セリ。右規約ハ其ノ實施確保ノ爲ニスル方法未ダ不完全ナルニモセヨ既ニ平和的處理方法及不正ニ侵略ヲ被ル國ニ對スル援助ノ適用ヲ基礎トスル完全ナル安全保障ノ組織ノ根柢ヲナスモノナリ。各國カ現實ニ其ノ軍備ヲ縮少シ得ルハ各國カ外部ヨリノ援助ニ期待シ得ル場合ニ限ル。軍備ニ關スル一般の專門的協定カ豫メ政治的協定アルヲ前提トスルコト、特ニ完全ナル海軍協定カ交戰國及中立國ノ權利ヲ定メ且侵略國ニ對スル他ノ國ノ海軍ノ協力ヲ規定スル海洋自由ノ問題ニ關スル協定ヲ前提トスルハ誠ニ其ノ處ナリ

佛國政府ハ右事態ヲ遺憾トスルニ拘ラス現狀ニ適合スル解決ニ達セシムル爲倫敦ニ會商スヘキ諸國ニ對シ其ノ一切ノ協力ヲ致サムトスル決意ヲ有ス

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方式ノ問題モ亦重要ナリトス。華府會議ノ例ニ倣ヒ米國政府及英國政府ハ數字上最モ強大ナル五大海軍ノミニ關シ且比率ヲ基礎トスル評定方法ノ採用ヲ考慮セラレタルモノノ如シ

然レトモ羅馬海軍會議ノ例ニ徵スルモ華府條約ノ原則ハ國際聯盟カ千九百二十四年之ヲ一切ノ海軍國ニ擴張セムト試ミタルトキニ失敗ニ終リタルヲ見ル。然シテ壽府ニ於テ一再ナラズ比率ハ一切ノ國ニ付其ノ地理的地位及特殊ノ事情ヲ參酌シ各國ノ安全及共同動作ヲ以テスル國際義務ノ履行ニ支障ナキ最底限度ニ至ル軍備ノ一般の縮少ヲ規定セル聯盟規約第八條ノ合理的且有效ナル適用ヲ可能ナラシメサルコトヲ證明セラレタリ

實ニ會議ハ海軍軍備制限方式ニ關スル一般の協定ヲ壽府ニ於テ可能ナラシムルニ至リテ始メテ其ノ目的ヲ貫徹シタルモノト云フヘシ

二

前記一般の所言ハ倫敦會議中佛國政府ノ執ルヘキ方針ヲ明確ナラシムル爲必要ナリシナリ

(一) 佛國政府ハ其ノ署名ヲ尊重シ國際聯盟規約第八條ニ基キテ其ノ軍備ノ縮少ヲ爲サムトス。佛國政府ハ準備委員會事業

ノ基礎タリ且何等數字的方式ノ「ア・プリオリ」ノ適用ヲ伴ハサル右基礎ニ依リテノミ倫敦ニ代表ヲ派セサル諸國ノ受諾シ得ヘキ協定作成セラルモノト思考ス

第八條ノ範圍内ニ於テ海軍軍備制限ニ付壽府ニ於テ二方式ノ對立ヲ見タリ。總噸數ニ依ル制限及艦種別ニ依ル制限之ナリ。強大海軍國カ後者ニ贊意ヲ表セルニ對シ、他ハ總テ前者ヲ採リタリ

右ノ如ク對立セル見解ノ調和ヲ容易ナラシメムト欲シ佛國代表部ハ既ニ千九百二十七年四月一ノ妥協方式ヲ提案シタル處右ハ今次會議ニ代表セラレサル一切ノ海軍國ニ依リ受諾セラレ且他ノ數國ヨリ好意ヲ以テ迎ヘラレタリ。殊ニ米國政府ハ再度ニ互リ右方式ヲ討議ノ基礎トナスニ吝ナラサル旨ヲ公ニセリ。右方式ハ總噸數ニヨル制限ヲ該噸數ノ重要艦種間ニ行フ配分ノ公表並ニ一艦種ヨリ他ノ艦種ヘノ融通ヲ規定スルコトニヨリ補足セムトスルモノナリ

右方式ハ詳細ノ點ニ於テハ修正ヲ要スルコトアルヘキモ相互間ニ一層緊密ナル協定ヲナサムト欲スル國ニ對シ之ヲ可能ナラシムルモノナルニ付英米兩國政府ノ間ニ考慮セララルル必要ニ適合スルヲ得ヘシ。佛國政府ハ總噸數制限ヲ可トスルモ今尙ホ右妥協方式ニシテ一般協定ノ實現ヲ可能ナラシムルニ於テハ之ニ贊意ヲ表スルニ吝ナラス

(二) 壽府準備委員會事業ニ依リ一國軍備ノ總體即陸、海、空軍兵力ノ間ニ密接ナル相關關係アルコト明白トナレリ。佛國政府ハ大陸國タルト共ニ海國タリ、全世界ニ分布セル大殖民國ノ本國タル佛國ノ地理的地位ニ鑑ミ右ハ其ノ國防方針ノ根本原則タルコトヲ屢々闡明シタリ

佛國政府ハ倫敦ニ於テ陸軍及空軍々備ノ決定ニ關スル問題ニ言及スヘキ場合ニ至ルヲ欲セサルモ海軍防備ノ必要ニ相當スル噸數ハ最近準備委員會ニ於テ決定セラレタル方式ニ從ヒテ算定セラルル自國陸軍及空軍水準ト密接ナル關係ヲ有スルコトヲ明白ニシ置カムトス。右委員會ノ決定カ云爲セラルルニ於テハ佛國政府カ自國海軍々備ニ付テ確言スヘキ處ハ一切其ノ價值ヲ失フモノト知ルヘシ

尙佛國政府ハ右ノ如キ困難ニ拘ラス一切ノ軍備ノ制限ニ關スル一般條約ノ締結ヲ俟ツコトナク安シテ終局的協定ヲ結フ

コトヲ欲シ且結ヒ得ヘシト信スル國ニ對シ之ヲ可能ナラシムヘキ解決方法ヲ探究スルノ意アルコトヲ附言セムトス
(三) 前記所言ヲ留保シ、佛國代表部ハ三洋ニ跨ル佛國ノ地理的地位、千百萬平方基米ニ及フ殖民國タル發達(人口六千萬、貿易額三百二十億)ヲ考慮セル國家所要ニ應スル噸數ヲ明ニスルニ何等困難ヲ感セサルヘシ

右大殖民國ノ生存、之ヲ構成スル大ナル集團ノ適當ナル防備確保ノ義務、右集團相互及之ヲ本國ニ聯鎖スル政治上及經濟上ノ諸汎ノ關係、本國ノ保全及經濟生活保護ノ必要及總計三萬基米ヲ超ユル海岸線ノ安全ヲ監視スル任務ハ佛國政府カ聯盟規約第八條ノ適用ニ當リ看過スルヲ得サル佛國海軍ノ義務ヲ構成スルモノトス。尙佛國海軍ノ豫算ハ千九百十五年當時ニ比シ減額ヲ示シ居レリ。右ト同様ナル極メテ中庸ナル配慮ハ佛國カ自國ノ必要及右必要ヲ満足セシムルニ要スル兵力ノ評定ニ當リテモ常ニ之ヲ忘レサルヘシ

右ニ關シ佛國政府ハ設定セラルルコトアルヘキ安全保障ニシテ聯盟規約第十六條ニ規定セラルル侵略國ニ對スル國際連帶ノ約定ヲ完全ニ實施スヘキモノヲ最モ重視スヘシ

(四) 尙太平洋ニ關スル(四國)條約ノ華府海軍協定ノ締結ニ好影響ヲ與ヘタルニ鑑ミ佛國政府ハ一定地域ニシテ歐洲海軍國ノ大部分ニ關係スルモノニ付一層ノ改善ヲ實現シ得ヘキヤニ思考ス。地中海ヲ通スル交通路ノ英帝國ニ重要ナルハ佛國政府ノ熟知スル處ナリ。右ハ佛國ニトリテモ等ク重要ナリ。倫敦ニ代表ヲ派セサル地中海々々軍國就中西班牙ノ如キ地中海ニ於ケル海軍々事上ノ利害關係重要ナルモノヲ加ヘ、地中海々々軍國間ニ一ノ相互保障及非侵略協定ヲ實現スルコト可能ナラサルカ、佛國政府ハ海軍々備縮少ノ眞摯ナル希望ヲ有スルニヨリ右種協定ノ主義ニ贊意ヲ表シ以テ本問題ヲ提起スルモノナリ

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會議「プログラム」ヲ研究シタル處ニ基ク右一般の所言ヲ終ルニ臨ミ、佛國政府ハ其ノ特ニ注意ヲ喚起スルノ要アリト認メタル難點ト雖モ解決不可能ノモノト認メ居ラサルコトヲ聲明セムト欲ス

倫敦ニ會合スヘキ一切ノ政府カ佛國政府ト等ク誠實ナル協力ニ依リ諸般ノ困難ニ打克ツヘキ手段ヲ講セラルヘキヲ確信スルト共ニ、平和組織ニ關スル(全世界)民衆ノ共同ノ願望ニ満足ヲ與フヘキ唯一ノモノタル軍備制限及縮少一般會議ヘノ道程タルヘキ審議ノ成功ヲ信シテ疑ハス

(11) 昭和五年一月十日附英國政府覺書

本覺書ハ昭和四年十二月二十日附佛國政府覺書ニ關ベキ英國政府ヘ同答シタル一頁十四頁
「タレント」號ニ附キタルモノナリトシテハ

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have given the most careful consideration to the memorandum communicated to them on December 20 last in which the French Government explain their views upon various questions connected with the forthcoming London Naval Conference. His Majesty's Government much appreciate the frank and friendly attitude of the French Government in furnishing them with so comprehensive an elucidation of their point of view, and in reiterating their assurance that they are determined to make the Conference successful.

In issuing their invitation to the London Conference, his Majesty's Government considered that it would not conduce to the success of the Conference if the various Governments were to entrench themselves, before the Conference opened, in positions—based perhaps on misunderstandings—from which they could not recede; nor in the invitation did his Majesty's Government refer to obligations contracted under the Covenant, or to questions of national security and such considerations, because they are clearly inherent in all disarmament negotiations and must be in the mind of every nation taking part in this Conference. One of the great advantages of the frequent meetings at Geneva is that Governments have opportunities to understand each other's respective positions and problems, and his Majesty's Government felt that it was unnecessary to recite elementary obligations, internal and external, but rather to concentrate upon the supremely important problems which have to be faced. The considerations set out in such a friendly spirit in the French memorandum will of course be in the minds of all the delegates.

It is true that there may not yet have been devised a complete machinery of sanctions to enforce the various peace agreements now in existence; but in the meantime much has been done and his Majesty's Government place considerable trust in the fact that 56 countries have declared their intention to renounce war as an instrument of national policy and to resort only to pacific means for the settlement of international disputes. Unless a beginning in the reduction of naval armament is held to be justified by the measure of security already achieved through the Covenant of the

League of Nations, the Quadruple Treaty relating to the Pacific, the Treaties of Locarno, the signature of the Optional Clause of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice by 33 countries, and, finally, the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, public expectation will be disappointed, the tendency towards an expansion in arms which is only too evident already will develop, and the nations will be taught once more in practice to trust only to military preparations for their security. His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the nations attending the London Conference may, by agreement on reduced naval strengths, register their confidence in the great advance made since the War in the provision of national security by political agreement.

His Majesty's Government observe with interest the distinction drawn in the French memorandum between the Pact of Paris and the Covenant of the League. They would suggest, however, that the two documents may also be regarded as complementary one of another. From this standpoint the Pact of Paris, by its renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, may be held by the States which are members of the League of Nations to have completed the structure of peace which the more restricted language of the Covenant had for the time left unfinished. His Majesty's Government accept fully and unreservedly all the obligations of the Covenant, which, however, must not be held to involve a delay in progressive steps for disarmament, for which the Pact of Paris is a justification.

His Majesty's Government note the suggestion of the French Government that it is doubtless due to the absence from the Kellogg Pact of any provisions for its methodical application that they have been deterred from contemplating any considerable reduction in their naval establishments. His Majesty's Government desire to remove the error upon which this observation rests. In response to the better prospects of peace and of an international agreement the British proposals, as a matter of fact, provide for a very considerable reduction in the strength which the British Empire has considered necessary in all categories of combatant vessels, from capital ships to submarines.

In Part II, section 1, of their memorandum the French Government refer to the system of limitation of naval armaments by "global tonnage." His Majesty's Government have consistently expressed their preference for dealing with the problem of naval disarmament by a strict limitation of the types, tonnages and guns of all categories of warships, since they feel confident that any other method of limitation must tend to preserve those elements of competition and uncertainty which it will be one of the express objects of the Conference to eliminate. The problem of naval armaments

involves not only the amount of tonnage but the use to which it is put. Nevertheless, his Majesty's Government have studied with great care the "transnational proposal" to which the French Government refer, and are ready to discuss the possibility of some arrangement based upon that proposal.

The French Government emphasize in Part II, section 2, of their memorandum that there is a close interdependence between the various defensive armaments of a country and give the reasons why they regard this as a fundamental principle of their policy of national defence. His Majesty's Government agree that the problems of naval, land, and air disarmament cannot be completely dissociated one from another, but they do not take the view that no attempt should be made to deal with one unless all are being dealt with simultaneously. His Majesty's Government consider that the approach to disarmament can best be facilitated by attacking the problem in detail as is now proposed at the Naval Conference. In the end a complete disarmament agreement must cover the whole field of arms, and steady and continuous work will be required until that field has been covered. They therefore join the French Government in earnestly hoping that the Conference will result in an agreement which will commend itself to all the Powers represented on the Preparatory Commission, and, by facilitating the task of that body, hasten the summoning of a general disarmament conference.

As regards Part II, section 3, of the memorandum, his Majesty's Government note with satisfaction that the French Government, while taking due account of the naval requirements imposed by France's geographical position, will, like his Majesty's Government, continue to observe strict moderation in the appraisal of their needs, and that the French delegation will have no difficulty in indicating the extent of the tonnage required to meet the needs of their country.

His Majesty's Government have learnt with interest the views of the French Government regarding the desirability of a treaty of mutual guarantee and non-aggression between the Mediterranean Powers. They agree that the Four-Power Treaty relating to the Pacific which resulted from the Washington Conference exerted a happy influence upon the negotiation of the Washington Naval Treaty. His Majesty's Government would only point out at this stage that a treaty such as that suggested by the French Government appears to go considerably farther than the Pacific treaty above-mentioned, which provided only for the summoning of a conference for the settlement of controversies and

for joint consultation in the face of aggressive action. Inasmuch as all the Mediterranean Powers are members of the League of Nations, it would appear that facilities already exist for joint consultation in the event of need. There is a great measure of security in this, but his Majesty's Government would be glad to exchange views on the subject with all the Powers concerned.

In conclusion his Majesty's Government note with particular pleasure the opinion expressed by the French Government that none of the problems mentioned in their memorandum amount to irremovable obstacles, and they share entirely the confidence felt by the French Government that there will be cordial cooperation among the delegations to promote the great aims of the Conference, and that success will terminate their labours.

(右假譯文)

英國政府ハ佛國政府カ來ルヘキ倫敦海軍會議ニ關聯スル諸問題ニ對スル其見解ヲ説明スルタメ十二月二十日附ヲ以テ通告セラレタル覺書ニ對シ最モ慎重ナル考慮ヲ加ヘタリ英國政府ハ佛國政府カ其ノ見解ヲ巨細ニ涉リ闡明セラレ且會議ヲ成功セシメトスル決意ヲ再ヒ言明セラレタル其ノ率直且友好的態度ヲ大ニ多トスルモノナリ

倫敦會議ニ對スル招請狀ヲ發スルニ當リ英國政府ハ諸國政府カ會議開催前ヨリ一步モ讓歩シ得サル態度(恐ラクハ誤解ニ基ク)ヲ固持スルニ於テハ右ハ會議ノ成功ヲ齎ス所以ニアラスト思考セリ又英國政府ハ聯盟規約ヨリ生スル義務又ハ國ノ安全ト云フカ如キ問題ハ軍縮ニ關スル一切ノ商議ニ於テ必ス起リ來ル自明ノ事項ニシテ本會議ニ參加スル各國民ノ夙ニ了知シ居ル所ト認メ招請狀中之等ノ點ニハ敢テ言及セサリキ「ジュネーヴ」ニ於ケル頻繁ナル會合ノ大利益ハ各政府カ相互ノ立場及問題ヲ理解スルノ機會ヲ有スルコトニ存スルヲ以テ英國政府ハ對内的及對外的ノ自明ノ義務ヲ再言スルヲ不必要ト思考シ當面ノ最大重要問題ニ注意ヲ集中セル次第ナリ佛國覺書中ニ極メテ友好的精神ヲ以テ開示セラレタル事項ハ因ヨリ各國全權ノ等シク抱懷スルトコロナルヘシ

諸種現存平和保障條約ノ實施ヲ確保スヘキ完全ナル制裁機關ハ未タ組織セラレサルコト勿論ナリト雖モ今日迄ニ爲シタル其ノ事蹟モ尠少ナリト云フヘカラス英國政府ハ五十六國カ國家政策ノ手段トシテノ戰爭ヲ拋棄シ國際紛爭ヲ平和の手段ニ依リテノミ解決セムトスルノ意思ヲ宣言シタル事實ニ對シ甚大ノ信賴ヲ置クモノナリ國際聯盟規約、太平洋ニ關スル四國條約、「ロカルノ」條約、三十三國ノ常設國際司法裁判所選擇條項署名及殊ニ戰爭拋棄ニ關スル條約ニ依リテ今日迄ニ完成セラレタル安全保障ノ現狀ヲ以テシテ尙海軍軍備縮少ノ第一步ニ着手シ得スト言ハムカ輿論ハ失望スヘク既ニ明白ニ現ハレツツアル軍備擴張ノ傾向ハ益々増大スヘク各國民ハ其ノ安全ヲ保障スルタメ軍事の準備ニノミ信賴セムトスルノ風ヲ再ヒ馴致スルニ至ルヘシ英國政府ハ倫敦會議ニ參加スル各國カ世界大戦以來政治的協定ニ依リ國ノ安全保障ヲ圖ラムトスルノ企カ大ナル進歩ヲナシタルコトヲ確認スルノ意ヲ海軍軍縮條約ノ締結ニ依リ記錄ニ留メムコトヲ衷心希望スルモノナリ英國政府ハ佛國覺書中ニ示サレタル戰爭拋棄條約ト聯盟規約トノ間ノ區別ヲ興味ヲ以テ閱讀セリ然レトモ英國政府ハ右二條約ハ相互ニ補足スルモノトモ認メラレ得ヘシト言ハムトス此ノ見地ヨリスレハ戰爭拋棄條約ハ國家政策ノ手段トシテノ戰爭拋棄ヲ規定スルコトニ依リ聯盟國タル國家ニトリテハ聯盟規約ノ規定カ局限セラレ居ル爲メ目下未完成ノ儘トナレル平和組織ヲ完成シタルモノト言ヒ得ヘシ英國政府ハ聯盟規約ノ一切ノ義務ヲ完全ニ且何等ノ留保ナク受諾スルモノナルモ此ノ義務アルノ故ヲ以テ軍備縮少ノ進捗ヲ遲延セシムルモ已ムヲ得スト解スヘキニアラス之レ戰爭拋棄條約ノ本旨ナリ佛國政府ハ英國政府ニ於テ其ノ海軍軍備ノ著シキ縮少ヲ講シ得サル所以ノモノハ恐ラク戰爭拋棄條約ニ其ノ組織の適用ニ關スル規定ヲ缺クニ因ルモノナルヘシト述ヘラレタル處英國政府ハ右所言ノ基礎ヲナス誤認ヲ除去セント欲ス平和及國際協調ノ好望ナルニ呼應シ事實英國提案ハ英帝國カ主力艦ヨリ潛水艦ニ至ル一切ノ艦種ニ於テ其ノ從來必要ナリト認メ來レル海軍力ノ著シキ縮減ヲ包含シ居レルモノナリ

佛國覺書第一節第二項ニ於テ佛國政府ハ「總噸數」ニ依ル海軍軍備制限方式ニ言及セラレタリ英國政府ハ海軍軍縮問題ヲ一切ノ艦艇ノ艦型噸數及備砲ノ嚴格ナル制限ニ依リ處理スルヲ可トスル旨ヲ常ニ表明シ來レリ蓋シ他ノ制限方式ハ倫敦會議ニ於テ之ヲ除去スルコトヲ以テ其ノ明白ナル目的ノ一トナスヘキ競爭及不安ノ要素ヲ全ク除去シ得サルノ傾向アルコトヲ信スレハナリ海軍軍備ノ問題ハ管ニ噸數ノミナラスカ使用方法ノ問題ヲ包含ス尤モ英國政府ハ佛國政府ノ言及セラレタル「妥協案」ヲ慎重研究シタル上該提案ヲ基礎トスル協定ノ可能ナリヤ否ヤヲ討議スルノ用意アリ

佛國政府ハ其ノ覺書第二節第二項ニ於テ一國ノ各種ノ防衛的軍備ノ間ニ密接ナル相關關係アルコトヲ力説セラレ之ヲ以テ其ノ國防政策ノ根本原則ト思考セラレル理由ヲ述ヘラレタリ英國政府ハ海軍陸軍及空軍ノ軍縮問題ハ之ヲ完全ニ分離シ得ヘカラストノ點ニハ同意スルモ總テノ問題ヲ同時ニ處理スルニアラサレハ其ノ一ヲ處理スルコトヲ企圖スヘカラストノ見解ニハ左袒セス英國政府ハ軍縮問題ノ處理ハ今次會議ニ於テ提案セララルカ如ク先ツ問題ノ一部ヲ解決スルコトニヨリ最モ容易トナルヘシト思考ス究極ニ於テ完全ナル軍縮協定ハ全般ノ軍備ニ涉ラサルヘカラサルハ勿論ナルモ之カ爲ニハ着實且繼續的ノ努力ヲ必要トス依テ英國政府ハ今次會議ニ於テ一切ノ軍縮準備委員會參加國ノ贊認スル協定成立シ同委員會ノ事業ヲ容易ナラシメ以テ一般的軍縮會議ノ召集ヲ促進スルニ至ルヘキヲ佛國政府ト共ニ衷心希望スルモノナリ

覺書第三節第二項ニ關シテハ英國政府ハ佛國政府カ同國ノ地理的地位ニヨリ必要トスル海軍ノ要求ニ對シ適當ナル考慮ヲ拂フモ英國政府ノ如ク其ノ需要ノ評定ニ當リ大ニ中庸ノ態度ヲ維持スルモノナル旨竝ニ佛國代表部カ同國ノ需要ニ應スヘキ所用噸數ノ範圍ヲ支持スルニ困難ヲ感セサル旨ヲ述ヘラレタルヲ満足トス

英國政府ハ地中海關係國間ノ相互保障及非侵略條約成立ヲ望マシトセララル佛國政府ノ見解ヲ興味ヲ以テ了承セリ英國政府ハ「ワシントン」會議ニ於テ成立セル太平洋ニ關スル四國條約カ「ワシントン」海軍條約ノ商議ニ好影響ヲ與ヘタルコトハ之ヲ認ムルモ唯佛國政府ノ提案セララルカ如キ條約ハ戰爭解決ノ爲メ會議ヲ招集シ且侵略行爲發生ノ場合共同協議ヲ爲スヘキコトヲ規定スルニ過キサル前記ノ太平洋條約ヨリモ著シク進ミタルモノノ如ク此ノ點ハ今ヨリ之ヲ指摘シ置カムト欲ス一切ノ地中海關係國カ聯盟國タル以上必要ノ場合共同協議スルノ便宜ハ既ニ存在スト言フヘシ此ノ點ニ於テ既ニ大ナル安全保障存在スト雖モ英國政府ハ本問題ニ付一切ノ關係國ト喜ンテ意見ノ交換ヲ爲スヘシ

最後ニ英國政府ハ佛國政府カ其ノ覺書所載ノ何レノ問題モ排除シ難キ障害ヲ爲スモノニ非ラストノ意見ヲ表示セラレタルコトヲ特ニ欣快トシ會議ノ大目的達成ノ爲メ各國代表部ノ間ニ友好的協調保タレ各代表部ノ努力カ成功ニ終ルヘシトノ佛國政府ノ確信ニ全然同感ノ意ヲ表スルモノナリ

(12) 倫敦會議ニ於ケル地中海問題討議ニ關スル昭和五年一月十五日附

在京西班牙公使館覽書

Legacion de Espana Tokio.

No-4-

MEMORANDUM.

Pendant que, aux préparatifs de la prochaine Conférence de Londres, c'était seulement question du Désarmement Naval, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Catholique, s'est maintenant en qualité de spectateur, se réservant pour faire valoir son opinion, lorsque la Commission Préparatoire de la Société des Nations renouvellera ses séances; mais aussitôt que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Royale a su qu'il y a des indices qu'à la Conférence de Londres on pourrait discuter à propos de la question de la Méditerranée, il s'est empressé de demander aux Gouvernements Français, Britannique et Italien, intéressés plus directement à cette importante affaire, qu'il ne soit pas traité à la Conférence de Londres sans que l'Espagne soit du premier moment invitée à être présente aux délibérations, en vu que ses intérêts et titres à prendre part en première ligne à quelqueque discussion sur la Méditerranée, sont incontestables.

Malgré que la position du Gouvernement Impérial, est tout à fait différente à celle des pays susmentionnés, en vu que la question de la Méditerranée ne lui affecte pas directement, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Catholique, comme un témoignage de la très spéciale amitié désire lui faire part de la démarche faite près des Gouvernements des pays intéressés directement à la Méditerranée et il ne doute pas que le Gouvernement Impérial se fera part de très fondées raisons qui lui ont obligé à faire cette demande, et reconnaitra les justes titres de l'Espagne à être présente aux conversations relatives à la Méditerranée, même si elles sont abordées à une Conférence convoquée pour traiter du Désarmement Naval.

Tokio, le 15 Janvier 1930.

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(右假譯文)

來ルヘキ倫敦會議ノ準備ニ當リ海軍軍備縮少ノミカ問題タリシ間ハ西班牙國政府ハ單ニ傍觀者ノ地位ニ止マリ國際聯盟ノ準備委員會カ會議ヲ再開スルトキ其意見ヲ開陳スヘキコトヲ留保シ居リタリ然レトモ西班牙國政府カ倫敦會議ニ於テ地中海問題ヲ討議スルコトアリ得ヘキ徵候アルヲ知ルヤ西班牙國ハ地中海ニ關スル如何ナル討議ニモ第一ニ參加スヘキ利益及權利ヲ有スルコトハ爭フヘカラサル所ナルヲ以テ此重要ナル問題ニ最直接ナル利害ヲ有スル佛蘭西國、英國及伊太利國政府ニ對シ西班牙國カ最初ヨリ討議ニ出席スヘキ招請ヲ受ケサル限り倫敦會議ニ於テ同問題ヲ論議セサルヘキコトヲ直ニ要求セリ

帝國政府ノ地位ハ地中海問題カ直接同政府ニ影響セサルヲ以テ前記各國ノ地位ト異ナルモ西班牙國政府ハ地中海ニ直接利害關係ヲ有スル各國政府ニ對シテ採レル措置ヲ最特殊ナル友情ノ證左トシテ帝國政府ニ通報セント欲ス而シテ西班牙國政府ハ同政府ヲシテ該要求ヲ爲スヲ餘儀ナクセシメタル最正當ナル理由ヲ帝國政府カ了解シ且地中海ニ關スル會談ハ海軍軍備縮少問題ヲ論議スル爲ニ招請セラレタル會議ニ於テ爲サルル場合ト雖モ西班牙國カ之ニ出席スヘキ正當ナル權利ヲ有スルコトヲ承認スヘキヲ疑ハサルモノナリ

(13) 昭和五年二月六日米國全權聲明書

米國海軍大臣ハ六日米國全權「ローレンス」ニ對シテ報告書ヲ送リテ云ク

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION IN FRIDAY MORNING PAPERS

AMERICAN DELEGATION, LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE.

STATEMENT BY HENRY L. STIMSON, CHAIRMAN OF THE AMERICAN

DELEGATION, FEBRUARY 6, 1930.

At the opening of the Conference the United States Delegation made no statement of its position of the needs of its country beyond the historical fact of the agreement in principle for parity between Great Britain and the United States. We are now in a position where we can go further. Following discussions among ourselves and negotiations with the British and Japanese which have clarified the limits of possible agreement our Delegation has made suggestions as follows:

First, with Great Britain immediate parity in every class of ship in the navy. The gross tonnage of these two fleets is substantially 1,200,000 tons apiece. The negotiations between President Hoover and Prime Minister MacDonald last summer practically reduced the discussion of parity between them to the comparatively insignificant difference in their respective cruiser class tonnage of 24,000 tons. We propose to settle this difference as follows: Under our suggestion the actual tonnage difference between the two cruiser fleets will be only 12,000 tons. Of the larger cruisers armed with eight-inch guns Great Britain will have fifteen and the United States eighteen, an advantage to the latter of 30,000 tons. Of the smaller cruisers armed with six-inch guns Great Britain will have an advantage of 42,000 tons. But beyond this, in order to insure exact equality of opportunity the United States makes the suggestion that each country will have the option of duplicating exactly the cruiser fleet of the other. Thus Great Britain would have the option by reducing its number of small cruisers to increase its large cruisers from fifteen to eighteen so as to give it a total tonnage of 327,000 tons, the exact amount of tonnage which the United States now asks. On the other hand, the United States

would have the option, by reducing its large cruisers from eighteen to fifteen, to increase the number of its small cruisers so as to give it a total cruiser tonnage of 339,000 tons, the exact amount of tonnage which the British now ask.

In battleships we suggest by reduction in numbers on both sides to equalize our two fleets in 1931 instead of in 1942. At present the British battleship fleet contains two more vessels than ours. In destroyers and aircraft carriers we suggest equality in tonnage and in submarines the lowest tonnage possible. As is well known we will gladly agree to a total abolition of submarines if it is possible to obtain the consent of all five powers to such a proposition, and in any event we suggest that the operations of submarines be limited to the same rules of international law as surface craft in operation against merchant ships so that they can not attack without providing for the safety of the passengers and crew.

Second, our suggestion to the Japanese would produce an over-all relation satisfactory to us and, we hope, to them. In conformity with our relations in the past it is not based upon the same ratio in every class of ships.

We have not made proposals to the French and Italians whose problems are not so directly related to ours that we feel it appropriate at this time to make suggestions to them. A settlement of the Italian and French problem is essential, of course, to the agreement contemplated.

The United States Delegates do not feel at liberty to discuss any further details in figures, and it is obvious, that the announcement of hypothetical figures by others is calculated only to provoke argument.

Our delegation is in agreement on every item of our program and we are in the most hopeful spirit that in co-operation with the other delegations the primary purposes of the Conference, namely, the termination and prevention of competition in Naval Armament and such reductions as are found consistent with national security may be accomplished.

This is all that we deem it helpful to state until our suggestions have been considered by the delegations to whom they have been sent.

(右譯文)

會議開會ニ當リ米國全權部ハ歴史的事實タル英米間ノ均勢ニ關スル主義上ノ協定ニ付述ヘタル外米國ノ所要ニ關シ全權部

ノ立場ヲ聲明セサリキ吾人ハ今ヤ更ニ一步ヲ進ムルヲ得ルノ地位ニ在リ部内ノ討議及成立シ得ヘキ協定ノ限界ヲ明瞭ナラシメタル英、日トノ交渉ノ結果我全權ハ左ノ提議ヲナシタリ

第一、英國ト各艦種ノ即時均勢、兩國艦隊ノ總噸數ハ實質上各百二十萬噸ナリ「フリーヴァー」大統領ト「マクドナルド」首相トノ客年夏ノ交渉ノ結果兩國均勢ニ關スル討議ハ實際上兩國巡洋艦級ニ於ケル二萬四千噸ナル比較的小ナル差異ニ減縮セラレタリ吾人ハ右ノ差異ヲ左ノ如ク解決セント欲ス吾人ノ提案ニ依レハ兩國巡洋艦隊ノ現實ノ噸數ノ差ハ僅ニ一萬二千噸トナルヘシ八吋砲搭載大型巡洋艦ニ付テハ英國ハ十五隻米國ハ十八隻ヲ有スルコトトス之レ米國ニトリ三萬噸ノ優勢ナリ六吋砲搭載小型巡洋艦ニ付テハ英國ハ四萬二千噸ノ優勢ヲ持スルコトナル加之米國ハ嚴密ナル均等ノ機會ヲ保障センカ爲メ一方ハ他方ノ巡洋艦隊ト全然同一ノモノヲ作ルノ選擇權ヲ有スヘキコトヲ提議ス然ルトキハ英國ハ小型巡洋艦ノ隻數ヲ減少スルコトニ依リテ其ノ大型巡洋艦ヲ十五ヨリ十八ニ増加シ以テ現ニ米國ノ要求スルト全然同一ノ噸數タル合計三十二萬七千噸ヲ保有スルノ選擇權ヲ有スヘシ他方米國ハ大型巡洋艦ノ隻數ヲ十八ヨリ十五ニ減少シ以テ現ニ英國ノ要求スルト全然同一ノ噸數タル巡洋艦合計噸數三十三萬九千噸ヲ保有スルノ選擇權ヲ有スヘシ

主力艦ニ於テハ双方共隻數ヲ減少スルコトニ依リ一九四二年ヲ待タスシテ一九三一年ニ於テ兩國艦隊ヲ均勢トナスコトヲ提議ス目下英國主力艦隊ハ吾人ヨリ二隻多數ナリ驅逐艦及航空母艦ニ於テハ噸數ノ均勢ヲ及潛水艦ニ於テハ能フ限りノ小噸數ヲ提議ス五國全部ノ同意ヲ得ルコト可能ナルニ於テハ吾人ハ欣ンテ潛水艦ノ全廢ニ贊スルモノナルコト世ノ熟知スル所ナリ且何レニスルモ吾人ハ商船ニ對シ行動スル場合其ノ乗客及乗組員ノ安全ニ備フルコトナクシテ之ヲ攻撃シ得サラシムル爲メ潛水艦ノ行動ヲ水上艦艇ト同一ノ國際法規ニ服セシムヘキコトヲ提議ス

第二、日本ニ對スル吾人ノ提議ハ吾人ニ執リテ満足ナル且恐ラク日本ニ執リテモ満足ナル全般的ノ關係ヲ招致スヘシト思量ス過去ニ於ケル兩國ノ關係ニ顧ミ右提議ハ各艦種ニ付同一比率ヲ基礎トスルモノニアラス

吾人ハ佛國及伊國ニ對シテハ提議ヲナササリキ右二國ノ問題ハ吾人カ今提議ヲナスニ適スト考フルニ足ル程度ニ吾人ノ

問題ト直接關係ヲ有セサルナリ伊佛問題ノ解決ハ吾人ノ目的トスル協定ニ緊要ナルコト勿論ナリ米國全權ハ茲ニ數字ニ付一層詳細ニ論議スルノ自由ヲ有セスト思考ス而シテ他ニ假想的數字ヲ發表スルモノアラハ右ハ徒ラニ議論ヲ惹起スルニ過キサルコト明ナリ

吾全權部ハ吾案ノ各事項ニ付意見一致ス而シテ吾人ハ會議ノ主要目的即海軍軍備競争ノ終熄乃至豫防及國家ノ安全ト兩立スル軍備ノ縮少カ他國全權部ト協同達成セラルヘキヲ最モ樂觀シ居ルモノナリ

以上ハ吾人ノ提議カ對手國ノ全權部ニ依リ考慮セラルルニ至ル迄ノ間ニ於テ吾人ノ聲明スルヲ可ナリト考フル全部ナリ

(14) 昭和五年二月七日「マクドナルド」ヨリ送付越セル英國政府覺書

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.
7th February 1930.

Dear Mr. Wakatsuki,

I am sending to you for your confidential information the enclosed Memorandum in which is set forth the general point of view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on the question under consideration at the London Naval Conference. I ought to add that for the information of Parliament I must publish this Memorandum in the immediate future as a White Paper.

Yours very sincerely,
(Sgd) J. Ramsay MacDonald.

H.E.M. Reijiro Wakatsuki.

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1930.

MEMORANDUM ON THE POSITION AT THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE OF HIS
MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

PART I.

1. The policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is to keep the highway of the seas open for trade and communication, and, in relation to the political state of the world, to take what steps are necessary to secure this.

2. The Government is directing its policy to secure this by cooperating with the League of Nations, making friendly compacts with other nations, strengthening the International Court, accepting arbitration in international disputes, honouring the Peace Pact of Paris, and otherwise aiding in tranquillising the world. Whilst it believes that the result of that policy will be ultimately to eliminate the causes of war and establish peace on an unassailable foundation, it recognises that there must be a time of transition which will be marked by a steady decline in the importance and amount of armaments of all kinds, ending in disarmament.

3. The transition time should be marked by efforts to carry the security against war afforded by political and judicial agreement further and further and to mark progress by disarmament treaties.

For this reason the Government considers the London Naval Conference of supreme importance, and believes that it ought to put an end finally to competition in naval armaments and reduce existing fleets and building programmes.

4. In estimating what fleet is required the Government has also to take account of the obligations which the country has undertaken in consequence of the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations (partly offset, though they are, by the pooled security afforded us under the Covenant by its provision of mutual support), and other commitments which it has inherited and which it has to fulfil in relation to the present condition of the world. In deciding what these amount to in terms of naval strength, the Government must estimate the chances of war breaking out because, if this is not done, fleets will be built which will never be of any use, but which will threaten rather than protect and at best will be a waste of national resources.

5. The Government takes the view that if the strengths of national fleets is not to be a menace, they must be the subject of international agreements, the purpose of which should be to maintain an equilibrium. This equilibrium will not be secured by mere numerical equality in ships and tonnage which may indeed be a condition of serious inequality from the point of view of effectiveness but by agreed programmes which will be based on considerations of requirements affecting dispersion etc., and in which menace will be reduced as much as possible. For this, there can be no general formula or ratio. It must be the subject of agreements made from time to time at Conference such as this.

6. As the political conditions determining world security are not fixed, agreements should be made for periods at

the end of which they should be reviewed and during which governments should be engaged in strengthening the foundations of peace.

7. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposes that the general agreement will run till 1936 and that in 1935 a further conference will be called to review the situation in relation to world conditions. Governments will be asked to agree to make all adjustments necessary in their programmes and existing strengths in the term of the agreements before a date to be fixed before the end of 1936, and it will be suggested that the Conference in 1935 should deal with the situation after 1936.

PART II.

With these considerations and aims in mind His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom makes the following proposals for the consideration of the Conference.

(1) It believes that an agreement should not only be upon total fleet tonnage (global tonnage) but upon the size of individual ships in the various recognised fleet categories and the amount of tonnage which nations use in each of the categories. The categories should be those in general use amongst naval Powers to-day: capital ships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines.

An agreement by categories is essential to obtain certain conditions of security; 1. the elimination of competitive building; 2. the maintenance of the equilibrium between national fleet and national fleet. It is not only the gross tonnage of a fleet which counts but the use to which the tons are put and an agreement on the latter is required.

(2) At the same time, whilst an agreement upon category totals is essential to establish the feeling of security, it might be convenient if a percentage of tonnage assigned to different categories of certain types of vessels might be allowed to be transferred to certain other types, but His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom does not favour a general transfer. For the classes of capital ships, aircraft carriers and submarines there should be no transfer. Within the cruiser category it is proposed that transfer should be permitted out of the 8" class into the 6" class on a percentage to be arranged, an agreed evaluating factor being employed for such transfer. The object of this arrangement is to take account of the special needs of countries requiring a larger proportion of cruisers of a small type.

(3) As regards small cruisers and destroyers, it is probable that some nations with smaller navies may find a rigid division into these categories unworkable. H. M. Government in the United Kingdom will be prepared to consider a transfer of tonnage between these categories to take account of the special needs of the Powers in question.

(4) Turning to the question of the size and number of capital ships, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposes that the limit of numbers fixed by the Washington Treaty should be reached within 18 months of the ratification of the Treaty arrived at by the London Naval Conference instead of in 1936; that no replacement of existing ships should take place before the next Conference in 1935, and that in the meantime the whole question of capital ships, their number, size and gun calibre, should be the subject of negotiation between the Powers which have built them. Without disturbing the Washington equilibrium and therefore security, the Government will press for reduction. The British Admiralty have informed the Government that it would favour a reduction in size from 35,000 tons to 25,000 tons and of gun from 16" to 12", together with a lengthening of the age from 20 to 26 years. The Government invites an exchange of views upon this subject before the Conference disperses. As regards no other category of ships is there a better opportunity of meeting peace requirements or of effecting economies.

In the opinion of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom the battleship, in view of its tremendous size and cost and the development of the power of attack in the air and under water, is a very doubtful proposition and they would wish to see an agreement by which the battleship would in due time disappear altogether from the fleets of the world.

(5) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom considers that the evolution of the aircraft carrier both in tonnage and in calibre of guns should be limited, and that ships of 10,000 tons and under should be included in the total tonnage assigned to the class. The Government proposes a total tonnage of, say, 100,000 for the British and United States navies as compared with a total tonnage of 135,000 under the Washington Treaty, and an adjustment of the assigned to other nations on the Washington Treaty ratios; that the maximum size should not exceed 25,000 tons and the age be lengthened from 20 to 26 years.

(6) The conversations of last summer between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain turned almost exclusively upon cruisers, and underlying them was the assumption that these should be grouped in one category

subdivided into those carrying 8" guns and those carrying 6" guns and under. The negotiations were further conducted on the assumption that the requirements of the British Commonwealth would consist of 50 cruisers with a total tonnage of 339,000. A final arrangement will depend on the decisions of this Conference as regards limitation in size of units. The Government proposes that a general agreement should not change the tonnage limit of 8" cruisers provided for in the Washington Treaty, but fix that the smaller vessels at about 6,000 or 7,000 tons, with a further agreement that only a fixed proportion of the ships in that class should be built up to that limit. It also proposes to fix the life of cruisers at 20 years.

(7) The size and total tonnage of the destroyer class must largely depend on the size and tonnage of the submarine class. The Government proposes that the limit of size should be for leaders 1,850 tons with 5" guns (maximum) and 1,500 tons for destroyers also with 5" guns (maximum). Its present building programme will ultimately consume 200,000 tons, but this can be reduced if the submarine programmes of other Powers are similarly reduced.

(8) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposes the abolition of the submarine. The argument that this arm is one solely of defence is, in the opinion of the British Admiralty, destroyed by the experience of the late war. In war conditions it is an arm of attack, carrying offence into new fields and extending war fronts. If an agreement upon this is impossible, the Government will put forward proposals limiting submarines rigidly to defence requirements in numbers and size. Its position during the negotiations on this arm will be to obtain the lowest possible limits. It will also propose to revive the agreement signed at Washington on February 6th, 1922, but not fully ratified by the Signatory Powers, to regulate the attack of merchant ships by submarines in accordance with the rules and practice set forth in the treaty.

(9) Below this there will be types of auxiliary vessels used for purposes ancillary to fleets but which do not strictly speaking enter into fleet strengths. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposes that they should be specified and that each government should agree to publish each year lists of such vessels with their individual tonnage in commission or actually building.

February 4th, 1930.

(15) 昭和五年二月十日英國議會ニ提出スル英國政府覺書

本覺書は、ロンドン海軍軍縮會議ニ提出スルものなり。

MEMORANDUM ON THE POSITION AT THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1930, OF
HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

London, February 4, 1930.

PART I.

1. The policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is to keep the highway of the seas open for trade and communication, and, in relation to the political state of the world, to take what steps are necessary to secure this.

2. The Government is directing its policy to secure this by co-operating with the League of Nations, making friendly compacts with other nations, strengthening the International Court, accepting arbitration in international disputes, honouring the Peace Pact of Paris, and otherwise aiding in tranquillising the world. Whilst it believes that the result of that policy will be ultimately to eliminate the causes of war and establish peace on an unassailable foundation, it recognises that there must be a time of transition which will be marked by a steady decline in the importance and amount of armaments of all kinds, ending in disarmament.

3. The transition time should be marked by efforts to carry the security against war afforded by political and judicial agreements further and further and to mark progress by disarmament treaties.

For this reason the Government considers the London Naval Conference of supreme importance, and believes that it ought to put an end finally to competition in naval armaments and reduce existing fleets and building programmes.

4. In estimating what fleet is required the Government has also to take account of the obligations which the country has undertaken in consequence of the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations (partly offset, though they

are, by the pooled security afforded under the Covenant by its provision of mutual support), and other commitments which it has inherited and which it has to fulfil in relation to the present condition of the world. In deciding what these amount to in terms of naval strength, the Government must estimate chances of war breaking out because, if this is not done, fleets will be built which will never be of any use, but which will threaten rather than protect and at best will be a waste of national resources.

5. The Government takes the view that if the strengths of national fleets are not to be a menace, they must be the subject of international agreements, the purpose of which should be to maintain an equilibrium. This equilibrium will not be secured by mere numerical equality in ships and tonnage—which may indeed be a condition of serious inequality from the point of view of effectiveness—but by agreed programmes which will be based on considerations of requirements affecting dispersion, etc., and in which menace will be reduced as much as possible. For this, there can be no general formula or ratio. It must be the subject of agreements made from time to time at Conferences such as this.

6. As the political conditions determining world security are not fixed, agreements should be made for periods at the end of which they should be reviewed and during which Governments should be engaged in strengthening the foundations of peace.

7. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposes that the general agreement should run till 1936 and that in 1935 a further conference should be called to review the situation in relation to world conditions. Governments will be asked at the present Conference to agree to make all adjustments necessary in their programmes and existing strengths by a date to be fixed before the end of 1936, and it will be suggested that the Conference in 1935 should deal with the situation after 1936.

PART II.

With these considerations and aims in mind His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom makes the following proposals for the consideration of the Conference:—

(1.) It believes that an agreement should not only be upon total fleet tonnage (global tonnage), but upon the size of individual ships in the various recognised fleet categories and the amount of tonnage which nations use in each of the

categories. The categories should be those in general use amongst naval Powers to-day: capital ships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines.

An agreement by categories is essential to obtain certain conditions of security, such as the elimination of competitive building and the maintenance of the equilibrium between national fleet and national fleet. It is not only the gross tonnage of a fleet which counts, but the use to which the tons are put and an agreement on the latter is required.

(2.) At the same time, whilst an agreement upon category totals is essential to establish the feeling of security, it might be convenient if a percentage of tonnage assigned to different categories of certain types of vessels might be allowed to be transferred to certain other types, but His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom does not favour a general transfer. For the classes of capital ships, aircraft carriers and submarines there should be no transfer. Within the cruiser category it is proposed that transfer should be permitted out of the 8-inch class into the 6-inch class on a percentage to be arranged, an agreed evaluating factor being employed for such transfer. The object of this arrangement is to take account of the special needs of countries requiring a larger proportion of cruisers of a small type.

(3.) As regards small cruisers and destroyers, it is probable that some nations with smaller navies may find a rigid division into these categories unworkable. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will be prepared to consider a transfer of tonnage between these categories to take account of the special needs of the Powers in question.

(4.) Turning to the question of the size and number of capital ships, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposes that the limit of numbers fixed by the Washington Treaty should be reached within eighteen months of the ratification of the Treaty arrived at by the London Naval Conference instead of in 1936; that no replacement of existing ships should take place before the next Conference in 1935, and that in the meantime the whole question of capital ships, their number, size and gun calibre, should be the subject of negotiation between the Powers which have built them. Without disturbing the Washington equilibrium and therefore security, the Government will press for reduction. The British Admiralty have informed the Government that it would favour a reduction in size from 35,000 tons to 25,000 tons and of guns from 16-inch to 12-inch, together with a lengthening of the age from twenty to twenty-six years. The Government invites an exchange of views upon this subject before the Conference disperses. As regards no other category of ships is there a better opportunity of meeting peace requirements or of effecting economies.

In the opinion of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom the battleship, in view of its tremendous size and cost, is of doubtful utility and the Government would wish to see an agreement by which the battleship would in due time disappear altogether from the fleets of the world.

(5.) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom considers that the evolution of the aircraft carrier both in tonnage and in calibre of guns should be limited, and that ships of 10,000 tons and under should be included in the total tonnage assigned to the class. The Government proposes a total tonnage of, say, 100,000 for the British and United States navies as compared with a total tonnage of 135,000 under the Washington Treaty, and an adjustment of that assigned to other nations on the Washington Treaty ratios; that the maximum size should not exceed 25,000 tons and the age be lengthened from twenty to twenty-six years.

(6.) The conversations of last summer between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain turned almost exclusively upon cruisers, and underlying them was the assumption that these should be grouped in one category subdivided into those carrying 8-inch guns and those carrying 6-inch guns and under. The negotiations were further conducted on the assumption that the requirements of the British Commonwealth would consist of fifty cruisers with a total tonnage of 339,000. A final arrangement will depend on the decisions of this Conference as regards limitation in size of units. The Government proposes that a general agreement should not change the tonnage limit of 8-inch cruisers provided for in the Washington Treaty, but fix that of the smaller vessels at about 6,000 or 7,000 tons, with a further agreement that only a fixed proportion of the ships in the class should be built up to that limit. It also proposes to fix the life of cruisers at twenty years.

(7.) The size and total tonnage of the destroyer class must largely depend on the size and tonnage of the submarine class. The Government proposes that the limit of size should be for leaders 1,850 tons with 5-inch guns (maximum) and 1,500 tons for destroyers, also with 5-inch guns (maximum). Its present building programme will ultimately consume 200,000 tons, but this can be reduced if the submarine programmes of other Powers are similarly reduced.

(8.) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposes the abolition of the submarine. The argument that this arm is one solely of defence has been destroyed by the experiences of the late War. In war conditions it is

an arm of attack, carrying offence into new fields and extending war fronts. If an agreement upon this is impossible, the Government will put forward proposals limiting submarines rigidly to defence requirements in numbers and size. Its position during the negotiations on this arm will be to obtain the lowest possible limits. It will also propose to revive the agreement signed at Washington on February 6th, 1922, but not fully ratified by the signatory Powers, to regulate the attack of merchant ships by submarines in accordance with the rules and practice set forth in the treaty.

(9). Below this there will be types of auxiliary vessels, used for purposes auxiliary to fleets, which do not strictly speaking enter into fleet strengths. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposes that they should be specified and that each Government should agree to publish each year lists of such vessels with their individual tonnage in commission or actually building.

London, February 4, 1930.

(右要譯文)

第一部

- 一、英國政府ノ政策ハ通商及通信ノ爲海路ヲ開放シ且之ヲ確保スル爲世界ノ政局ニ應シ必要ナル手段ヲ講スルニアリ
- 二、政府ハ右政策遂行ノ爲メ國際聯盟ト協力シ、諸國ト友好的約定ヲ結ビ、國際裁判所ヲ有力ナルモノトシ、國際爭議ニ關シ仲裁々判ヲ受諾シ、不戰條約ヲ尊重シ、其他世界ノ靜穩ヲ保ツコトニ助力シツ、アリ、右政策ノ結果究局ニ於テハ戰爭ノ原因ハ除去セラレ確乎タル基礎ノ上ニ平和ハ樹立セラルヘシト信スルモ之ニ先タチ各種ノ軍備ノ重要性ト量トカ遞減シ遂ニ軍備撤廢ヲ見ルニ至ル一ノ過渡期ノ存在スルコトヲ認メサルヲ得ス
- 三、此ノ過渡期ハ政治的及司法的協定ノ供與スル戰爭ニ對スル安全保障ヲ一層増進セントスル努力ニ依リテ著名トナリ且數次ノ軍縮條約ニ依リテ進歩ノ跡ヲ刻スルモノタラサルヘカラス

此ノ故ニ政府ハ倫敦海軍會議ヲ以テ極メテ重大ナルモノト思惟シ且右會議カ海軍々備競爭ノ終焉ヲ齎ラシ現存艦隊及建造計畫ノ減少ヲ行ハサル可カラスト信ス

四、如何ナル艦隊ヲ必要トスルヤヲ算出スルニ當リ政府ハ國際聯盟規約ニ依リ課セラレタル義務ノ如何(右義務ハ相互援助ノ規定ニ依リ規約ノ與フル共同ノ安全保障ノ爲メ一部分輕減セラルルモ)及其他政府ノ繼承シ且世界ノ現狀ニ關聯シ履行セサル可カラサル約定等ヲ考量セサル可カラス、之等ヲ海軍力ニ見積リ幾何トナルヘキヤヲ決定スルニ當リテハ政府ハ戰爭勃發ノ機會ヲ計量セサル可カラス如何トナレハ若シ然ラサレハ將來何等用ニ供スルコトナキ艦隊ヲ建造シ防衛ヨリ却テ脅威トナリ最善ノ場合ニ於テモ國帑ノ浪費トナルヘケレハナリ

五、政府ハ若シ各國海軍力ニシテ脅威ト成ルヘキモノニアラストセハ右ハ國際協定ノ對象トナラサル可カラストノ見解ヲ持スル處右國際協定ノ目的ハ均衡ヲ維持スルニアリト云ハサル可カラス此ノ均衡ハ單ニ軍艦及噸數ノ數字的均等ノミニヨリテ確保スルヲ得ス一實力ノ點ヨリ云ヘハ右ハ寧ロ重大ナル不平等ヲ來スモノトモ言ヒ得ヘシ一却ツテ軍艦ノ分散其他ノ需要ヲ基礎トスルト共ニ他國ノ脅威トナルコトヲ能フ限リ減少スル建造協定ニ依ラサル可カラス、之ニ對シテハ一般のナル方式若ハ比率ハ存在シ得ヘカラス時々今回ノ如キ會議ヲ開キ協定スヘキモノナリ

六、世界ノ安全ヲ決定スル政治的狀態カ未タ定マラサル今日協定ハ期限ヲ劃シテ締結シ一期間ノ終リニ於テ協定ヲ再考シ其ノ間政府ハ絶エス平和ノ基礎確立ニ努力スヘシ

七、英國政府ハ一般協定ハ一九三六年迄之ヲ繼續シ一九三五年ニ世界ノ狀勢ニ應シテ事態ヲ再考セツカ爲メ更ニ他ノ會議ヲ招集センコトヲ提議シ且各國政府ニ對シ一九三六年末以前ノ一定期日迄ニ其ノ建造計畫及現有勢力ニ對シ必要ナル一切ノ整理ヲ爲スノ同意ヲ與ヘンコトヲ今次會議ニ於テ要請セントス而シテ一九三五年ノ會議ハ一九三六年以後ノ事態ヲ處理スヘキモノタルヘキコトヲ提議ス

前記諸項及目的ニ稽ヘ英國政府ハ會議ノ考究ニ供センカ爲左ノ如ク提議ス

- (1) 英國政府ハ協定ハ單ニ總噸數ニ付テノミナラス各艦種ノ單艦艦型並ニ各國カ各艦種ニ充ツヘキ噸數ニ付爲サレサルヘカラサルヲ信ス右艦種ハ現今各海軍國間ニ一般ニ使用セラルルモノ即チ主力艦、航空母艦、巡洋艦、驅逐艦及潛水艦タルヘシ

艦種別ニヨル協定ハ造艦競争ノ終止及各國海軍間ノ均衡維持ト云フカ如キ安全保障ノ條件ヲ確保スルニ必要缺クヘカラサルモノナリ要ハ單ニ艦隊ノ總噸數ノミニアラスシテ噸數ノ使途ニアリ之ニ關シ協定スルヲ必要ナリトス

- (2) 艦種別總計ニ付テノ協定カ安全感樹立上必要缺クヘカラサルト同時ニ他方若シ一艦種ニ割當テラレタル噸數ノ或步合ヲ他ノ一艦種ニ融通スルヲ許サルルニ於テハ好都合ナルヘキモ英國政府ハ一般の融通ニハ賛成セス主力艦、航空母艦及潛水艦ニ付テハ融通ヲ認メス巡洋艦艦種内ニ於テハ八吋砲艦ヨリ六吋砲艦ニ合意ニ依リ定メラルヘキ步合ノ融通ヲ認メ斯ル融通ニハ合意ニ依ル勢力測定ノ尺度ヲ使用センコトヲ提案ス右ハ小型巡洋艦ニ於テ大ナル割合ヲ必要トスル諸國ノ特殊所要ヲ考量ニ入レントスル目的ニ出ツルモノナリ

- (3) 小型巡洋艦及驅逐艦ニ關シ此等諸艦種ノ嚴重ナル區分ハ小海軍ヲ有スル諸國ニ對シ運用ノ餘地ヲ與ヘサルモノナルコトアルヘク英國政府ハ之等諸國ノ特種所要ヲ考慮センカ爲前記艦種間ノ噸數融通ヲ考慮スルノ用意アリ

- (4) 主力艦ノ艦型及隻數問題ニ付テハ英國政府ハ華府條約規定ノ隻數ハ一九三六年ヲ待タス倫敦海軍會議ニ於テ締結セラルル條約ノ批准後十八ヶ月以内ニ到達セラルヘク一九三五年ノ次回會議以前ニハ現有艦ノ代換ヲ行ハス且其レ迄ノ間ニ主力艦ヲ建造セル各國間ニ於テ主力艦問題全部即チ其ノ隻數、艦型及備砲口徑ニ付交渉センコトヲ提議ス英國政府ハ華府條約ニ依ル均衡從テ安全ヲ覆スコトナクシテ縮少ノ實ヲ舉クルニカムヘシ英國海軍省ハ政府ニ對シ艦型ヲ三萬五千噸ヨリ二萬五千噸ニ、備砲ヲ十六吋ヨリ十二吋ニ減小シ同時ニ艦齡ヲ二十年ヨリ二十六年ニ延長スルニ賛成ナ

ル旨ヲ通報シ來レリ政府ハ會議散會前本件ニ關スル意見ノ交換ヲ歡迎ス他ノ如何ナル艦種ニ付テ見ルモ是以上平和ノ要求ニ合致シ經費ノ節減ヲ實現スル好機ナカルヘシ

英國政府ノ所見ニ依レハ主力艦ハ其巨大ナル艦型及經費ニ鑑ミ效力疑ハシク政府ハ主力艦カ相當期間内ニ世界ノ艦隊ヨリ全部消滅スルカ如キ協定成立ヲ見ンコトヲ希望ス

- (5) 英國政府ハ航空母艦ノ艦型及備砲ノ増大ヲ制限シ一萬噸以下ノ艦船ヲモ本艦種割當噸數中ニ加フヘキモノナリト思考ス政府ハ例ヘハ華府條約ニヨル總噸數十三萬五千噸ニ比シテ英米兩海軍ニ對シテハ總噸數十萬噸トシ各々諸國ニ對スル割當量ヲモ華府條約比率ニ基キ調整スヘキコト及最大艦型ハ二萬五千噸ヲ超エス艦齡ハ二十年ヨリ二十六年ニ延長スヘキコトヲ提議ス

- (6) 昨夏英米兩國政府間ノ談合ハ殆ト専ラ巡洋艦ニ關シ且右談合ハ巡洋艦ハ八吋砲搭載ノモノト六吋砲以下ヲ搭載ノモノトノ二ニ再分セラレタル一艦種ニ纏ムヘシトノ假定ヲ根柢トシテ行ハレ且右交渉ハ英帝國ノ所要ハ巡洋艦五十隻其總噸數三十三萬九千噸ヨリ成ルトノ假定ニ基キ行ハレタリ

最終決定ハ固ヨリ單艦々型制限ニ關スル本會議ノ決定如何ニ係ル政府ハ華府條約規定ノ八吋砲巡洋艦ノ單艦噸數ハ今次ノ海軍協定ニ依リ之ヲ變更スヘキモノニアラサルモ輕巡洋艦ノ單艦噸數ヲ約六千噸又ハ七千噸ト定ムヘク且該艦種中一定割合ノミ右最大限ノモノヲ建造スルヲ得ヘシトノ協定ヲ作成センコトヲ提議ス政府ハ又巡洋艦々齡ヲ二十年ト定メンコトヲ提議ス

- (7) 驅逐艦々種ノ艦型及總噸數ハ主トシテ潛水艦々種ノ艦型及總噸數如何ニ係ラサルヲ得ス政府ハ艦型制限ハ嚮導驅逐艦ニ付テハ千八百五十噸備砲(最大)五吋トシ驅逐艦ニ付テハ千五百噸備砲(最大)同シク五吋トナサンコトヲ提議ス政府ノ現建造計畫ハ究極ニ於テ二十萬噸ヲ要スヘキモ他國ノ潛水艦建造計畫ニシテ同様縮少セラルルニ於テハ之ヲ縮少シ得ヘシ

- (8) 英國政府ハ潛水艦ノ廢止ヲ提議ス本武器ハ全然防禦ヲ目的トストノ理由ハ世界大戰ノ經驗ニヨリ覆ヘサレタリ戰時狀態ニ於テハ潛水艦ハ攻撃ノ武器ニシテ攻撃ニ新分野ヲ開キ戰線ヲ擴大ス若シ之カ協定ニシテ不可能ナリトセハ政府ハ潛水艦ヲ隻數ニ於テモ艦型ニ於テモ防禦上必要ナル程度ニ嚴重制限スルノ案ヲ提議スヘシ本武器ニ關スル交渉中ニ於ケル政府ノ態度ハ最低限度ノ制限ヲ獲得セントスルニアリ
- 政府ハ又一九二二年二月六日華府ニ於テ調印セラレタルモ未タ締約各國全部ノ批准ヲ得ルニ至ラサル協定ヲ復活シテ該協定中ニ規定セラレタル法則及慣行ニ從ヒ潛水艦ニ依ル商船ノ攻撃ヲ規律センコトヲ提議ス
- (9) 彼上ノ外艦隊ノ附隨任務ニ使用セラレ嚴格ニ云ヘハ艦隊勢力中ニ入ラサル諸補助艦船アリ英國政府ハ之等ヲ特定シ且各國政府カ毎年就役又ハ建造中ノ之等艦船ノ單艦噸數ヲ舉ケタル艦船表ノ公表ニ同意センコトヲ提議ス

一九三〇年二月四日 倫敦ニ於テ

(16) 昭和五年二月十三日附帝國全權聲明書 (第一部(11)と同1)

(17) 昭和五年二月十三日附佛國全權聲明書原案

本文書ハ二月十二日附ニテ二月十三日「イミダリ」ヨリ永井金權ニ手交セラルモノナリ

Confidentiel.

12 Février.

En remettant les 4 tableaux joints, la Délégation française croit devoir les accompagner des observations suivantes:

I.

En raison de l'importance qu'elle attache aux principes de l'interdépendance des armements, la Délégation française insiste à nouveau sur ce qu'aucune décision définitive relative à la fixation du niveau des armements navals ne saurait être prise en faisant abstraction de la solution à donner au problème de la limitation des armements terrestres et aériens.

En conséquence, et conformément à son memorandum du 20 décembre 1929, le Gouvernement français serait heureux de se mettre d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique sur la ligne de conduite que tiendront à Genève les représentants des deux pays.

II.

La Délégation française rappelle d'autre part, que la France a sensiblement réduit ses forces navales par rapport à l'avant-guerre.

Elle avait, en 1914, une flotte de 964.500 tonnes anglaises en service et en construction, plus 174.800 tonnes anglaises de constructions autorisées, soit un total de 1.139.306 tonnes anglaises. Elle a, aujourd'hui, en service et en construction, ou autorisée, une flotte de 681.808 tonnes anglaises.

Seule d'ailleurs des grandes nations maritimes, la France a, en 1926, un budget naval inférieur de 18% à son budget d'avant-guerre.

Le programme adopté en 1924 par le Gouvernement français et qui se réalise depuis lors par tranches annuelles, représente par rapport à la situation de 1913 une réduction de 357.000 tonnes. La France a donc, dans le même esprit que la Grande-Bretagne, sensiblement abattu ses programmes sans attendre les décisions éventuelles de la présente Conférence.

III.

Si les Puissances représentées à la Conférence doivent prendre comme base de leur accord l'établissement des programmes de 1930 à 1936, la France serait disposée à entrer dans cette voie dans les conditions de chiffres indiqués par les tableaux joints sous la double réserve de décisions correspondantes des 4 autres Puissances et de la ratification des Chambres françaises.

On remarquera que la France arrive à ce résultat en consacrant 82% de son effort au remplacement des bâtiments vieillissants et 18% seulement aux constructions de complément.

IV.

En ce qui concerne les capital ships, la Délégation française signale que la France n'a pas usé du droit qui lui appartient de construire avant 1930 les 70.000 tonnes représentant le tonnage de remplacement de la "France" disparu en 1922, ainsi que du "Jean Bart" et du "Courbet" dont le déclassement peut, aux termes du traité de Washington, intervenir dès 1930.

La France est obligée, en raison de l'apparition d'un nouveau type de capital ship, d'utiliser une partie de ce crédit de 70.000 tonnes pour mettre en chantier un capital ship dont elle souhaite que le déplacement puisse être aussi réduit que possible et dont l'armement serait composé de canons de 305 mm. (12 pouces). Elle peut même être amenée à mettre en chantier avant le 1er Janvier 1937 la totalité du crédit de 70.000 tonnes visé ci-dessus si de nouveaux bâtiments du même type venaient à être construits.

Dans le cas où seraient proposées des vacances navales pour les capital ships jusqu'en 1936, la France serait donc disposée à en accepter le principe sous la seule réserve qui vient d'être faite et qui se réfère à un droit existant avant la réunion de la Conférence.

TAB. No 1.

STATUT NAVAL

TONNAGE GLOBAL ET REPARTITION DE CE TONNAGE ENVISAGE PAR LE STATUT

	Tonnage global:	800.000 Tonnes (2240 lbs)	
BATIMENTS DE LIGNE...	...	...	175.000
FORTE-AERONEFS ...	...	...	60.000
CROISEURS No 1 avec canons de 155 exclus à 203 inclus	...	...	390.000
CROISEURS No 2 avec canons d'un calibre égal ou inférieur à 155...	...	...	
CONTRE-TORPILLEURS & TORPILLEURS	...	...	
SOUS-MARINS de croisière de haute mer, mouilleurs de mines, côtières	...	...	125.000
BATIMENTS SPECIAUX...	...	...	50.000
			800.000

TAB. No 2.

FIOTTE AU 1er JANVIER 1930.

Bâtiments en service, en construction ou pour lesquels des crédits sont votés.

Ce tableau est fait dans l'hypothèse où les bâtiments spéciaux seraient répartis dans les autres classes.

BATIMENTS DE LIGNE			
a) soumis aux règles de Washington	...	...	133.136 tonnes (2240 lbs)
b) non soumis aux règles de Washington	...	...	52.791 "
(3 "DIDEROT")			
CROISEURS DE 10.000 Tx Washington	...	70.000	} 136.993 "
CROISEURS anciens armés de canons d'un calibre supérieur à 155	...	66.963	
CROISEURS armés de canons d'un calibre égal ou inférieur à 155	...	38.902	} 228.897 "
— postérieur à 1922	...	25.625	
(y compris 1 croiseur-école & 2 mouilleurs de mines)	...	...	
— antérieurs à 1922	...	...	...
(y compris les avisos, 2 petits mouilleurs de mines et 1 mouilleur de filets)	...	...	...
CONTRE-TORPILLEURS ET TORPILLEURS			
— postérieurs à 1922	...	109.490	} 32.146 "
— antérieurs à 1922	...	54.880	
PORTE-AERONEF (y compris un transport d'hydravions)			
SOUS-MARINS			
— postérieurs à 1922	...	76.911	} 97.875 "
— antérieurs à 1922	...	21.964	
			681.808

TABLEAU No 3.

Constitution de la flotte telle qu'elle peut être envisagée au 31 Décembre 1936.

— BATIMENTS EN SERVICE —

Le tonnage en construction entrant en service après cette date est compensé par le déclassement tonne pour tonne d'un tonnage égal de navires ayant dépassé la limite d'âge.

On s'est placé dans l'hypothèse où les bâtiments spéciaux seraient répartis dans les autres classes et où un bâtiment de ligne du déplacement qui pourrait être convenu serait construit. On a admis pour le tableau ce déplacement compris entre 20.000 et 25.000 t. — Ce bâtiment de ligne serait construit sans déclassement correspondant en remplacement du cuirassé "FRANCE".

BATIMENTS DE LIGNE		OBSERVATIONS	
a) soumis aux règles de Washington	156.466 Tonnes (2240 lbs)		
b) non soumis aux règles de Washington... ..	52.791 "	Tonnage entrant	
CROISEURS DE 10.000 Tx Washington... ..	100.000 "	en service de	
CROISEURS anciens armés de canons d'un calibre supérieur à 155.	24.850 "	1934 à 1936 :	
		120.970 tonnes	
BATIMENTS LEGERS (croiseurs armés de canons d'un calibre égal ou inférieur à 155—contre-torpilleurs, torpilleurs, etc...)			
PORTE-AERONEFS... ..	258.597 "	Tonnage déclassé	
SOUS-MARINS	32.146 "	de 1930 à 1936 :	
	99.629 "	78.299 Tonnes	
	724.479 "		

TABLEAU No 4.
FLOTTE AU 1^{er} AOUT 1914.

(Bâtiments en service, en construction ou pour lesquels des crédits étaient votés)

CUIRASSES	736,787	Tonnes (2240 lbs.)
CROISEURS	308,080	"
TORPILLEURS	57,698	"
SOUS-MARINS	35,547	"
BÂTIMENTS SPECIAUX	1,244	"

1,139,306 " "

(右譯文)

二月十二日 「機密」

佛代表部ハ別添四表ヲ通達スルニ際シ之ニ關シ左ノ説明ヲ爲スヲ必要ト信スルモノナリ

一

佛代表部ハ軍備相關々係ノ原則ヲ重視スルモノナルニ因リ海軍々備ノ水準ニ關スル終局的決定ハ其ノ如何ナルモノタルヲ問ハス陸軍及空軍々備制限問題ニ付與ヘラルヘキ解決ヲ考慮スルコトナク行ハルヘカラサルコトヲ玆ニ更メテ強調セムト欲ス

從テ千九百二十九年十二月二十日附覺書ニ基キ英佛二國代表者カ壽府ニ於テ執ルヘキ方針ニ付英國政府トノ間ニ合意ニ達シ得ハ佛國政府ハ大ニ欣幸トスヘシ

二

之ト同時ニ佛國代表部ハ佛國カ戰前ニ比シ著シク其ノ海軍兵力ヲ減少シタルコトヲ記セムトス

佛國ハ千九百十四年ニ於テ既成建造中ヲ合シ九十六萬四千五百英噸之ニ加フルニ協贊濟十七萬四千八百英噸總計百十三萬九千三百六英噸ニ達スル海軍力ヲ有シタリキ佛國ハ今日既成及建造中又ハ協贊濟ヲ合シ六十八萬一千八百八英噸ノ海軍兵力ヲ有ス又大海軍國中獨リ佛國ノミ千九百二十九年ニ於テ戰前ノ自國海軍豫算ニ比シ一割八分方減少セル豫算ヲ有セリ千九百二十四年佛國政府ニ依リテ採擇セラレ爾後年次のニ實行セラレツツアル計畫ハ千九百十三年ニ於ケル狀態ニ比較シ三十五萬七千噸ノ縮減ヲ示セリ因テ佛國ハ英國ト同様ノ精神ニ基キ本回會議ノ結果達スルコトアルヘキ決定ヲ俟ツコトナク其ノ計畫ヲ著ク縮減シタリ

三

本回會議ニ代表セラルル諸國カ千九百三十年乃至千九百三十六年ノ計畫作成ヲ以テ其ノ協定ノ基礎トナスヘキニ於テハ佛國ハ他ノ四國ノ之ニ對應スル決定竝佛國議會ノ承認ノ二條件ノ下ニ別表ニ示セル數字ニ基キ之ニ同意スルノ用意ヲ有ス佛國ハ自國努力ノ八割二分ヲ老齡艦ノ代換ニ單ニ一割八分ヲ補充的建造ニ充テテ右結果ニ達スル次第ナリ

四

佛國代表部ハ佛國カ主力艦ニ關シ千九百二十二年ニ亡失セル「フランス」竝ニ華府條約ノ規定ニ基キ千九百三十年ニ廢棄スルヲ得ル「ジャン・バール」及「クールベ」ノ代換噸數ニ相當スル七萬噸ヲ千九百三十年以前ニ建造シ得ルノ權利ヲ未タ行使セサルコトヲ指摘セムトス

主力艦ノ新出現ノ結果右七萬噸ニ關スル經費ノ一部ヲ主力艦一隻ノ起工ニ充テサルヲ餘儀ナクセラレタルカ其ノ排水量ハ出來得ル限り小ナラシメムコトヲ希望シ居レリ其ノ備砲ハ三百五耗(十二吋)タルヘシ右ト同型ノ主力艦更ニ建造セララル場合ニ於テハ佛國ハ前記七萬噸ノ經費全額ヲ千九百三十七年一月一日前ニ起工スルニ至ルコトアルヘシ

千九百三十六年迄主力艦建造休止方提議セラルル場合ニ於テハ今回會議召集ニ先テ既ニ存在セル權利ニ關スル前記ノ處ノミヲ留保シ其ノ原則ヲ承認スルニ吝ナラサルヘシ

第一 表

海軍建造計畫

本計畫ニ依ル總噸數及其ノ配分左ノ如シ

總 噸 數	八〇〇,〇〇〇噸 (一二四〇封度)
主 力 艦	一七五,〇〇〇
航 空 母 艦	六〇,〇〇〇
巡洋艦ノ一 (備砲一五五糎ヲ超ヘ二〇三糎以下)	三九〇,〇〇〇
巡洋艦ノ二 (備砲一五五糎以下)	
驅逐艦及水雷艇	
航洋潛水艦、水雷敷設艦及沿岸用艦艇	
特 種 艦	一二五,〇〇〇
計	五〇,〇〇〇
	八〇〇,〇〇〇

第二 表

一九三〇年一月一日現在勢力

既成、建造中又ハ協賛濟艦艇

本表ニ關シテハ特種艦艇ハ他ノ「クラス」ノ中ニ配分セラルルモノトセリ

主 力 艦	一三三、一三六噸 (一二四〇封度)
(イ) 華府規定ニヨルモノ	五二、七九一
(ロ) 然ラサルモノ (「ディプロ」級三隻)	
一萬噸巡洋艦	七〇,〇〇〇
備砲口徑一五五糎ヲ超ユル舊巡洋艦	一三六、九六三
備砲口徑一五五糎以下ノ巡洋艦	
一九二二年以後ノモノ	三八、九〇二
(練習艦一隻、敷設艦二隻ヲ含ム)	
一九二二年以前ノモノ	二五、六二五
(通報艦、一隻ノ小敷設艦及敷設網艦一隻ヲ含ム)	
驅逐艦及水雷艇	二二八、八九七
一九二二年以後ノモノ	一〇九、四九〇
一九二二年以前ノモノ	五四、八八〇
航 空 母 艦 (水上機母艦一隻ヲ含ム)	三二、一四六
潛 水 艦	
一九二二年以後ノモノ	七五、九一一
一九二二年以前ノモノ	九七、八七五
計	二一、九六四
	六八一、八〇八

第三表

既成艦艇

右期日後ニ就役スヘキ建造中ノ噸數ハ艦齡超過艦艇ノ同噸數ノ噸對噸ヲ以テスル廢棄ニヨリ補正セラルヘシ
特種艦艇ハ他ノ「クラス」ノ中ニ配分セラレ及今後協定セラルヘキ排水量ヲ有スル主力艦一隻建造セラルルモノト假定セ
リ本表ニ關シ右排水量ハ二萬噸乃至二萬五千噸トシタリ右主力艦ハ戰艦「フランス」代換トシテ建造セラルヘキモノニシ
テ之ニ相當スル廢棄ヲ行フコトナシ

主力艦

(イ) 華府規定ニヨルモノ

(ロ) 然ラサルモノ

一五六、四六六噸 (二二四〇封度)

五二、七七一

一萬噸巡洋艦

一〇〇、〇〇〇

備砲口徑一五五耗ヲ超ユル舊巡洋艦

二四、八五〇

輕艦艇(備砲口徑一五五耗以下ノ巡洋艦、驅逐艦、水雷艇等)

二五八、五九七

航空母艦

三二、一四六

潛水艦

九九、六二九

七二四、四七九

(注意) 一九三四年乃至一九三六年既成噸數

一二〇、九七〇

一九三〇年乃至一九三六年廢棄噸數

七八、二九九

第四表

一九一四年八月一日現在艦艇

(既成、建造中及經費協賛濟艦艇)

戰艦	七三六、七八七噸 (二二四〇封度)
巡洋艦	三〇八、〇三〇噸 ()
驅逐艦	五七、六九八噸 ()
潛水艦	三五、五四七噸 ()
特殊艦	一、二四四噸 ()
計	一、一三九、三〇六噸 ()

(18) 昭和五年二月十三日附佛國全權聲明書

本聲明書は三月十三日佛國全權部ニヨリ發せられたルニミテ原案ト大同小異ナリ

EXPOSÉ DE LA DÉLÉGATION FRANÇAISE À LA PRESSE.

La Délégation française, animée du même désir d'accord qui a inspiré les récentes déclarations des Délégations américaine et britannique, croit devoir, au point où sont arrivés les travaux de la Conférence, préciser comme suit sa position.

Pour la clarté de la présente note, il est signalé que les tonnes dont il sera question sont toutes des tonnes anglaises.

I.

Par rapport à l'avant-guerre, la France a sensiblement réduit ses forces navales.

Elle avait en 1914 une flotte de 964.000 tonnes anglaises en service et en construction, plus 174.000 tonnes anglaises de constructions autorisées, soit un total de 1.139.000 tonnes anglaises.

Elle a aujourd'hui, en service, en construction ou autorisée, une flotte de 681.808 tonnes anglaises, soit en moins 457.192.

Seule, d'autre part, des grandes nations maritimes, la France a, en 1929, un budget naval inférieur à son budget d'avant-guerre. Cette diminution est de l'ordre de 18 pour cent.

Enfin le programme naval adopté en 1924 par le Gouvernement français et qui se réalise depuis lors par tranches annuelles, représente à son plafond, par rapport à la situation de 1913, une réduction de 339.000 tonnes anglaises—réduction d'autant plus significative que l'arrangement franco-britannique concernant la distribution des flottes qui existait en 1914 n'est plus aujourd'hui en vigueur.

On peut donc dire que, dans le même esprit que la Grande-Bretagne et sans attendre les décisions éventuelles de la présente Conférence, la France a dès maintenant, et dans une large mesure, abattu ses programmes de construction.

II.

L'état de la flotte française au 1^{er} janvier 1930, comprenant les bâtiments en service, en construction ou autorisés se résume ainsi :

Bâtiments de ligne soumis aux règles de remplacement de Washington		133.136
Bâtiments de ligne non soumis aux règles de remplacement de Washington		52.791
Croiseurs de 10.000 tonnes (Washington)		70.000
Croiseurs anciens armés d'un calibre supérieur à 155		66.963
Croiseurs, contre-torpilleurs, torpilleurs et certains bâtiments spéciaux (1 croiseur-école, 2 mouilleurs de mines, etc.)		228.897
Porte-avions et transport d'hydravions		32.146
Sous-marins		97.875
Total		681.808

Au sujet des chiffres qui précèdent on notera que :

(1) les bâtiments de ligne non soumis aux règles de Washington sont trois bâtiments préreçus mis en service en 1911 que la France a été autorisée à conserver en dehors des dites règles ;

(2) que l'état de la flotte française au 1^{er} janvier 1930 accuse par rapport au 1^{er} Août 1914 les différences suivantes :

Bâtiments de ligne		en moins	550.860
Croiseurs et torpilleurs		pas de changement	—
Porte-avions		en plus	32.146
Sous-marins		en plus	62.328
Soit en moins		tonnes anglaises	457.000

Il convient en outre de rappeler ici que, seule de toutes les marines du monde, la Marine française n'a rien construit de 1914 à 1920, ses chantiers ayant été occupés pendant toute la guerre à la fabrication des munitions pour la France et pour ses alliés. C'est la raison pour laquelle elle est obligée de maintenir en service, au delà de l'âge normal de déclassement un tonnage important de bâtiments anciens, en particulier en cuirassés et croiseurs.

III.

Si, comme le proposent les communiqués publiés par les Délégations américaine et britannique, les Puissances représentées à la Conférence devraient prendre comme base de leur accord l'établissement de programmes de construction allant de 1930 à 1936, la Délégation française serait disposée à entrer dans cette voie, sous la double réserve d'une décision correspondante des quatre autres Puissances et de la ratification des Chambres françaises.

La constitution de la flotte française au 31 Décembre 1936 pourrait être, dans ces conditions, la suivante :

—Bâtiments de ligne soumis aux règles de remplacement de Washington	..	..	..	..	..	..	156.466
—Bâtiments de ligne non soumis aux règles de remplacement de Washington	..	..	..	..	..	..	52.791
—Croiseurs de 10.000 tonnes	..	..	..	..	..	..	100.000
—Croiseurs anciens armés de canons d'un calibre supérieur à 155	..	..	..	..	..	..	24.850
—Bâtiments légers (croiseurs armés de canons d'un calibre égal ou inférieur à 155, contre-torpilleurs, torpilleurs, etc.)	..	..	..	..	..	..	258.597
—Porte-aéronefs...	..	..	..	..	..	..	32.146
—Sous-marins	..	..	..	..	..	..	99.629
Total	..	..	..	..	..	..	724.479

Au sujet de ce second tableau, il convient de faire les remarques suivantes :

1) de 1930 à 1936, la France construirait 240.000 tonnes. Sur ces 240.000 tonnes, 48.200 représenteraient des constructions de complément et 196.800 tonnes des constructions de remplacement. En d'autres termes, de 1930 à 1936, la France consacrerait 82 pour cent de son effort au remplacement des bâtiments vieillissants et 18 pour cent aux constructions de complément.

- 2) le tonnage mis en construction avant 1936 et n'entrant en service qu'après le 31 décembre 1936 est compensé par le déclassement tonne pour tonne d'un tonnage égal de navires ayant dépassé la limite d'âge.
- 3) en ce qui concerne les bâtiments de ligne, on s'est placé dans l'hypothèse d'un déplacement compris entre 20.000 tonnes et 25.000 tonnes.
- 4) comme pour le tableau précédent, on s'est placé dans l'hypothèse de la répartition des bâtiments spéciaux dans les classes figurant au tableau.

IV.

Indépendamment de ces remarques spéciales, la Délégation française désire présenter ici deux observations de caractère général :

1) En ce qui concerne les bâtiments de ligne, la France n'a pas usé jusqu'ici du droit qui lui appartenait en vertu du Traité de Washington de construire avant la Conférence les 70.000 tonnes équivalant à la "France," disparue en 1922, au "Jean Bart" et au "Courbet" dont le tonnage de remplacement pouvait être mis en chantier dès 1927.

La France est dès maintenant obligée, en raison de l'apparition récente d'un type nouveau de cuirassé, d'utiliser une partie de ce crédit de 70.000 tonnes avant la fin de 1936 et elle pourrait être amenée à l'utiliser complètement pendant la même période si de nouveaux bâtiments du même type venaient à être construits.

Dans le cas donc où seraient proposées des vacances navales pour les cuirassés jusqu'en 1936, la France serait disposée à accepter les dites vacances jusqu'à concurrence de 105.000 tonnes.

2) En raison de l'importance qu'il attache au principe de l'interdépendance des armements, le Gouvernement français, conformément à son memorandum du 20 Décembre 1929, insiste à nouveau sur ce fait que toute décision de la Conférence de Londres au sujet des armements navals devra être prise en relation avec le problème de la limitation des armements terrestres et aériens.

V.

Les Délégations américaine et britannique représentant les deux Puissances invitées à la Conférence de Londres

ayant été seules jusqu'à ce jour à présenter des suggestions chiffrées, la Délégation française désire ajouter ce qui suit à la réponse qu'elle leur doit.

La France a suivi avec une chaleureuse sympathie les efforts des États-Unis et de la Grande-Bretagne pour préparer, après un mûr examen de leurs relations politiques, une réduction de leurs armements navals. De même que les Gouvernements de Washington et de Londres ont pu, à l'issue de cet examen, déclarer que la guerre entre leurs deux nations était inconcevable, de même la France est heureuse d'affirmer sa profonde conviction qu'entre son peuple et ceux des États-Unis et de l'Empire Britannique tout conflit armé est également inconcevable. Son statut naval, comme le leur, répond à une politique strictement défensive, dans le cadre des engagements internationaux dont elle est signataire, en particulier dans celui du pacte Briand-Kellogg.

C'est pourquoi la France ne s'est jamais alarmée de voir les États-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne, soit réduire, soit augmenter, en vue de réaliser leur accord, leurs forces navales respectives. Dans le même esprit de confiance mutuelle, elle compte que les chiffres ci-dessus exposés par elle comme la simple expression des besoins nationaux qu'elle a fait connaître à la première séance de la Conférence ne sauraient pas d'avantage inquiéter les deux autres nations.

Elle demeure, par ailleurs, ainsi qu'elle l'a toujours déclaré, prête à examiner avec faveur toute formule de garantie mutuelle de sécurité qui permettrait de transformer en besoins relatifs les besoins absolus de chacun.

(右譯文)

佛代表部ハ米國及英國代表部カ協調ノ希望ヨリ頃日聲明ヲナセルト同シ趣旨ニヨリ此際左ノ如ク其ノ立場ヲ明確ナラシムルヲ以テ其ノ義務ト信スルモノナリ

本文中ニ掲ケアル噸數ハ總テ英噸ニヨレリ

一

戰前ニ比較シ佛國ハ著ク其ノ海軍力ヲ縮減シタリ即千九百十四年佛國ハ就役中、建造中九六四、〇〇〇英噸及協贊濟一七

四、〇〇〇英噸計一、一三九、〇〇〇英噸ニ達スル海軍力ヲ有セルカ今日ハ就役中、建造中、協贊濟ヲ合セ六八一、八〇八英噸即四五七、一九二噸減少セル海軍力ヲ有スル次第ナリ

又大海軍國中佛國ノミ千九百二十九年ニ其ノ戰前ノ豫算ヨリ少キ海軍豫算ヲ有シ其ノ減額ハ一割八分ニ及ヘリ

佛國政府カ千九百二十四年ニ決定シ爾後年次のニ實施シツツアル海軍計畫ハ其ノ最高ニ於テ千九百十三年現在ト比較シ三十三萬九千英噸ノ減少ヲ示シ居レル處右減少ハ千九百十四年ニ存在セシ海軍力分配ニ關スル英佛協定カ最早效力ヲ失ヒタル今日ナルニ鑑ミ一層意義アリト云ハサルヘカラス

斯ノ如ク佛國ハ英國同様今次會議ノ決定ヲ俟ツコトナク著ク其ノ建造計畫ヲ縮少シタリ

二

一九三〇年一月一日現在佛國海軍勢力(就役中、建造中、協贊濟)左ノ如シ

華府代換規定ニヨル主力艦 一三三、一三六噸

華府代換規定ニヨラサル主力艦 五二、七九一

一萬噸(華府)巡洋艦 七〇、〇〇〇

備砲口徑一五五耗ヲ超ユル舊巡洋艦 六六、九六五

巡洋艦、驅逐艦、水雷艇及若干ノ特種艦艇 二二八、八九七
(練習用巡洋艦一隻、敷設艦二隻等)

航空母艦及水上機母艦 三二、一四六

潛 水 艦 九七、八七五

計 六八一、八〇八英噸

右數字ニ關シ注意スヘキ點左ノ如シ

(一) 華府規定ニ依ラサル主力艦トハ一九一一年ニ就役シ右規定ニ依ルコトナク佛國カ保有スルコトヲ許容セラレタル三隻ノ「ブレドレドノート」型艦ヲ云フ

(二) 一九三〇年一月一日現在佛國海軍勢力ト一九一四年八月一日當時トノ差左ノ如シ

主力艦	五五〇、八六〇噸減
巡洋艦及水雷艇	増減ナシ
航空母艦	三二、一四六噸増
潛水艦	六二、三二八噸増
差引	四五七、〇〇〇噸減

大戦中佛國造船所ハ自國及與國ノ軍需品製造ニ充テラレタルカ爲一九一四年ヨリ一九二〇年ノ間世界海軍中佛國海軍ノミ何等建造ヲ行ヒタルコトナク佛海軍カ正規艦齡ヲ超過セルニ拘ラス相當數ノ舊艦特ニ戰艦及巡洋艦ヲ已ムヲ得ス就役セシメタルハ實ニ右理由ニ基ケルナリ

三

英米代表部發表ニ係ル「コムミュニケ」提示ノ如ク本會議參加國カ一九三〇年乃至一九三六年ノ建造計畫作成ヲ以テ協定ノ基礎トナスヘキニ於テハ佛代表部ハ他四ヶ國ノ同様ノ決定並佛國議會ノ協賛ヲ條件トシテ右手續ヲ受諾スヘシ
一九三六年十二月三十一日現在佛海軍勢力ヲ示スコト左ノ如シ

華府代換規定ニヨル主力艦	一五六、四六六噸
華府代換規定ニヨラサル主力艦	五二、七九一
一萬噸巡洋艦	一〇〇、〇〇〇
備砲口徑一五五耗ヲ超ユル舊巡洋艦	二四、八五〇

輕艦艇(備砲口徑一五五耗以下ノ巡洋艦驅逐艦水雷艇等)

航空母艦	二五八、五九七
潛水艦	三二、一四六
艦	九九、六二九

總計

七二四、四七九英噸

右第二表ニ關シ注意スヘキ點左ノ如シ

(一) 一九三〇年乃至一九三六年ニ佛國ハ二十四萬噸ヲ建造スヘク右二十四萬噸中四萬三千二百噸ハ補足の噸數ニシテ一九六、八〇〇噸ハ代換噸數ナリ換言スレハ佛國ハ一九三〇年乃至一九三六年ニ自國勢力ノ八割二分ヲ老齡艦ノ代換ニ一割八分ヲ補足の建造ニ充テムトスルモノナリ

(二) 一九三六年前ノ建造ニ係リ一九三六年十二月三十一日以後ニ非スムハ就役セサル噸數ハ艦齡超過艦ノ同噸數ノ噸對噸ヲ以テスル廢棄ニヨリ補正セラルヘシ

(三) 主力艦ニ關シテハ排水量ヲ二萬噸乃至二萬五千噸ト假定セリ

(四) 前表ニ關スルト同様特種艦艇ハ表中ノ他ノ「クラス」中ニ配分スルモノトセリ

四

右特種注意事項ノ外ニ左ノ一般的注意事項ヲ記述セムトス

(一) 主力艦ニ關シ佛國ハ一九二二年ニ亡失セル「フランス」及一九二七年ニ其ノ代換噸數ヲ起工シ得タル「クールベ」「ジャン・パール」ニ相當スル七萬噸ヲ本會議前ニ起工スル華府條約所定ノ權利ヲ今日迄行使セサリシモ戰艦新型出現ノ爲今ヤ右七萬噸ニ對スル經費ノ一部使用ヲ餘儀ナクセラルルニ至リタリ同型ノ新艦カ更ニ建造セラルルカ如キコトアラハ一九三六年ノ末以前ニ右經費ノ全部ヲ使用セサルヘカラサルニ至ルコトアルヘシ因テ一九三六年迄戰艦建造休止方提案セラルル場合ニハ佛國ハ一〇五、〇〇〇噸マテ右休止ヲ受諾スルノ用意ヲ有ス

(二) 佛國政府ハ軍備ノ相關性ヲ重視スルモノナルニ因リ一九二九年十二月二十日覺書ニ基キ海軍ヲ備ニ關シ倫敦會議ノ爲スヘキ一切ノ決定ハ陸軍及空軍々々備制限ト關聯シテ行ハルヘキモノナルコトヲ玆ニ更メテ強調セムトス

五

今日迄ノ處倫敦會議ノ招請ニ強國ヲ代表スル米英全權部ノミ數字の提議ヲ爲セルヲ以テ佛國全權部ハ左ノ通り之ニ對スル回答ヲ玆ニ追加セント欲ス

佛國ハ英米兩國カ其ノ政治的關係ヲ慎重考量シ以テ其ノ海軍々々備縮減ノ前程ヲ作ラムトセル努力ヲ深キ好意ヲ以テ注視シ來レルカ英米兩國政府カ右考量ノ後右二國民間ニ戰爭ヲ想像シ得スト聲明シ得タルト同様ニ佛國ハ自國民ト合衆國及英帝國國民間ニモ等シク何等武力の紛争ヲ想像シ得ストノ深キ確信ヲ確言スルヲ欣幸トス佛國海軍計畫ハ右二國ノ夫レト同様佛國カ署名國タル國際約定殊ニ「ブリアン・ケロッグ」協定ノ範圍内ニ於テ全ク防禦的ナル政策ニ應シ居ルモノナリ然ルカ故ニ佛國ハ英國及米國カ兩國間ノ協定妥結ノ爲各自ノ海軍々々備ヲ増加スルトモ減少スルトモ不安ヲ感シタルコトナシ右ト同時ニ佛國カ本會議第一回會合ニ於テ披露シタル自國所要ヲ單ニ表示スルモノトシテ掲ケタル右數字モ亦右兩國民ニ不安ヲ與フルコトナキヲ期待ス

又終始聲明ノ通り佛國ハ各國ノ絶對の所要ヲ相對の所要ニ變更セシムルコト可能ナルカ如キ相互的安全保障ニ付テハソノ何タルヲ問ハス之ニ好意的審議ヲ加フルノ用意ヲ有スルモノナリ

(19) 昭和五年二月十九日伊國全權聲明書及說明書

本聲明書及說明書ハ二月十九日伊大和全權部事務總長佐藤公使ヲ來訪手交セシモノナリ

I—The Italian Delegation confirm their previous statements. They consider that armaments should be exclusively defensive, and should therefore be reduced to the lowest possible level. If the Conference should not lead to agreements determining the ratios of strength of the several navies and lowering the level of naval armaments, it will fail in its purpose and the hopes it has raised will be disappointed.

Armament levels and ratios are the basis of the Washington Treaty, and were the object of the negotiations preceding and preparatory to the present Conference. From the outset the Italian Delegation called the attention of the other Delegations to these two points, which they consider not only essential to the ends of the Conference, but which are also intimately connected with the determination of the methods of limitation to be adopted. The Italian Delegation note with satisfaction that the Conference is now taking these points into consideration. With reference thereto the Italian Delegation wish to restate that *Italy is prepared "a priori" to accept as limit for her armaments any figure, no matter how low, provided it be not exceeded by any other Continental European Power.*

Italy's geographical situation is particularly unfavorable. She has not the advantage of an ocean frontier; she is dependent for her very existence on supplies three fourths of which are conveyed from overseas along vulnerable trade routes, dominated at short distance by naval bases of various Powers. Moreover, Italy possesses no extra-Mediterranean naval bases, a fact which renders the task of protecting her merchant shipping on the high seas particularly arduous. Italy's problem is that of ensuring her existence, and not only that of safeguarding distant territories subject to her sovereignty or influence. Moreover, Italy, as signatory of the Treaty of Locarno, has incurred, together with Great Britain, special international commitments to guarantee the peace of continental Europe.

Notwithstanding her greater and special defence needs Italy is prepared to accept the self-limitation of her right to arm, and to reduce her armaments to any figure however low provided it be not exceeded by any European continental Power.

She strongly advocates reduction of naval armaments, because, as a member of the League of Nations, and as one of the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, Italy considers such a reduction as the natural outcome of those Treaties. It is by a reduction of armaments that Nations can show the value they attach to the aforesaid treaties and prove their loyalty to the pledge they have given. The idea of an armed conflict with any Power, whether represented or not at the London Conference, is totally foreign to the established naval policy of Italy.

II.—The Italian Delegation outline below the application of the principles above set forth to the state now reached in our negotiations, dealing first with vessels covered by the Washington Treaty, and subsequently with the others. The suggestions that follow are naturally subject to the stipulation of a general agreement.

A. VESSELS COVERED BY THE WASHINGTON TREATY.

(2) *Capital Ships.*

The Washington Treaty fixed the following ratios and total tonnages for capital ships:

	America	British Empire	Japan	France	Italy
Ratio	5	5	3	1.67	1.67
Tonnage	525,000	525,000	315,000	175,000	175,000

Under the Treaty Italy was entitled to retain the 10 capital ships she had in 1922. She has voluntarily scrapped six without replacing them, remaining with four capital ships. Moreover, in October 1928 she suggested that the signatory Powers should postpone until 1936 building the capital ships which each of them is entitled to lay down during the period 1931-1936.

The Italian Government—without prejudice to the agreements reached in Washington—maintain this suggestion, by which Italy would not lay down, for an agreed period, 105 thousand out of the 175 thousand tons assigned her, subject, of course, to the condition that the other signatory Powers accept the obligations resulting to each of them from the above suggestion.

Moreover, should the other Powers concur, Italy is prepared to examine favorably the abolition of capital ships.

(ii) *Air-Craft Carriers.*

	America	British Empire	Japan	France	Italy
Ratio	5	5	3	2.22	2.22
Tonnage	135,000	135,000	81,000	60,000	60,000

Under the Washington Treaty, Italy is entitled here and now to build up to the above figure of 60 thousand tons. The Italian Delegation are, however, prepared to undertake not to exceed the air-craft carrier tonnage actually possessed at any given time by the strongest continental Power of Europe.

B. VESSELS NOT COVERED BY THE WASHINGTON TREATY.

The Italian Delegation are prepared to undertake not to exceed the global tonnage of war vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty actually possessed at any given time by the strongest European continental Power. They are likewise prepared to agree not to exceed the total tonnage of submarines actually possessed at any given time by such a Power.

The above undertakings exclude the possibility that Italy should at any time exceed the armaments of the strongest European continental Power. Moreover, they afford the best guarantee that Italy, far from standing in the way of further reduction of armaments, will, on the contrary, be instrumental thereto.

The Italian Delegation do not exclude the possibility that they might consent to more extensive methods of limitation, should the Conference agree to an actual reduction based on agreed ratios of strength. In the meantime, they maintain the suggestion, made at Geneva in April 1927, to the effect that Italy is prepared to notify, six months at least before laying down the keel, the principal dimensions of the hull and the characteristics of the main armament of each ship to be built, provided the other Powers are willing to give a like undertaking.

With special reference to submarines, the Italian Delegation recall their statement to the effect that Italy has no objection to their abolition if a substantial reduction of naval armaments be secured, covering the abolition of capital ships. The Italian Delegation trust that in any case the submarine tonnage will be reduced.

The following table shows the present naval strength of the three European Powers in vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty. This table gives the figures of all vessels laid down or completed, not exceeding the agreed age limits of 20 years for cruisers, 16 for destroyers, and 13 for submarines.

Cruisers carrying 8" guns.

	<u>British Empire</u>		<u>France</u>		<u>Italy</u>	
	No	tons	No	tons	No	tons
Completed... ..	11	110,000	3	30,000	2	20,000
Building	4	36,800	3	30,000	4	40,000
Total:	15	146,800	6	60,000	6	60,000

Other cruisers carrying a gun above 6".

	<u>British Empire</u>		<u>France</u>		<u>Italy</u>	
	No	tons	No	tons	No	tons
Completed... ..	4	39,426	1	13,830(*)	2	20,940(*)

Cruisers carrying a gun of 6" and below:

	<u>British Empire</u>		<u>France</u>		<u>Italy</u>	
	No	tons	No	tons	No	tons
Completed... ..	39	177,685	7	41,870(*)	7	28,900(*)
Building	—	—	—	—	6	29,604
Total:	39	177,685	7	41,870	13	58,504

Leaders and destroyers:

	<u>British Empire</u>		<u>France</u>		<u>Italy</u>	
	No	tons	No	tons	No	tons
Completed... ..	150	157,585	60	70,738	78	73,814

Building	20	26,786	21	44,867	11	14,588
Total:	170	184,371	81	115,605	89	88,402

Grand total of cruisers and destroyers:

	<u>British Empire</u>		<u>France</u>		<u>Italy</u>	
	No	tons	No	tons	No	tons
Completed & Building	228	548,282	95	231,305	110	227,846

Submarines:

	<u>British Empire</u>		<u>France</u>		<u>Italy</u>	
	No	tons	No	tons	No	tons
Completed... ..	53	45,534	44	31,984	43	27,263
Building	10	14,750	47	49,783	14	9,825
Total:	63	60,284	91	81,767	57	37,088

(*) For vessels completed prior to 1922 normal displacement is given instead of standard displacement—Displacements in all cases in English tons.

EXPLANATORY NOTE FOR THE PRESS.

The statement transmitted to-day by the Italian Delegation to the American, British, French and Japanese Delegations confirms and illustrates the Italian disarmament policy.

With the statements recently made by the other Delegations, the Conference has begun to discuss the fundamental aspects of the problem. This is what the Italian Delegation desired should have been done from the outset, when they asked to place on the agenda two points, namely the determination of the ratios of strength of the navies and the determination of the maximum level of global tonnages. The Italian Delegation note with satisfaction that the Conference is now approaching these fundamental problems.

The Head of the Fascist Government has long ago summarised Italy's disarmament policy in the following terms: "Italy is prepared *a priori* to accept as limit for her armaments any figure, no matter how low, provided it be not exceeded by any other European Continental Power." This means that Italy is prepared to renounce her freedom of action in the matter of naval armaments to the full extent, to which the other European Continental Powers are prepared to go.

The Italian policy is thus based on two fundamental principles: reduction, and "one power standard."

The Italian Delegation consider that the existing conditions of security, resulting from international acts of such wide scope as the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Treaty, and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, justify that downward limitation which public opinion in all countries demands.

At the same time Italy's geographical position places her at such a disadvantage, that the one power standard represents the minimum of her defensive requirements.

After stating these general principles, the Italian Delegation proceed to examine them in relation to the present stage of the work of the Conference. For this purpose they deal separately with the vessels limited by the Washington Treaty and with those not covered thereby.

Briefly the Italian Delegation :

- 1) propose that the five Powers postpone building the capital ships that the Washington Treaty entitles them to lay down during the period 1931-36. This would entail for Italy postponing 105,000 out of the 175,000 tons assigned her by the Washington Treaty;
- 2) are prepared to consider the abolition of capital ships;
- 3) are prepared to undertake not to exceed the total aircraft carrier tonnage actually possessed by the strongest European Continental Power;
- 4) are prepared to undertake not to exceed the global tonnage of vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty possessed by the strongest European Continental Power, and also not to exceed at any time the total tonnage of such vessels actually possessed by said Power. Italy would thus accept, *a priori*, any reduction that such a Power might make during the life of the Convention;
- 5) are prepared to give a similar undertaking as regards the total tonnage of submarines;
- 6) are prepared to maintain the suggestion already made at Geneva to notify, six months at least before the laying down of the keel, the principal dimensions of the hull and the characteristics of the main armament of each ship to be built;
- 7) are prepared to examine favorably the proposal for the total abolition of submarines in connection with the possibility of effecting a substantial reduction in armaments, including the abolition of capital ships.

Finally the Italian Delegation would be prepared to consider more extensive methods of limitation, should the Conference come to an actual reduction based on agreed ratios of strength.

To the Italian statement is appended a table showing the present naval strength of Great Britain, France and Italy in vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty. This table gives the figures of all vessels actually building or completed of the three fleets, exclusive of those authorised and of those having exceeded the agreed age limits.

Grand total of light surface vessels

	British Empire		France		Italy	
	No	tons	No	tons	No	tons
Completed & Building 228	548,282		95	231,305	110	227,846

Submarines

	British Empire		France		Italy	
	No	tons	No	tons	No	tons
Completed ...	53	45,534	44	31,984	43	27,263
Building ...	10	14,750	47	49,783	14	9,825
Total:	63	60,284	91	81,767	57	37,088

The above figures show that:

1—the total Italian light surface vessel tonnage is 320,436 tons less than the British, and 3,459 tons less than the French;

2—the completed Italian submarine tonnage is approximately 18,271 tons less than the British and 4,721 tons less than the French. The difference for submarines laid down is very great, the French figures far exceeding the British and the Italian.

(右聲明書譯文)

一、伊國全權部ハ曩ニ發シタル其ノ聲明ヲ確認ス同全權部ハ軍備ハ全然防禦的タルヘキヲ以テ能フ限り低キ基準ニ縮少スヘキモノト考フ若シ會議カ關係國海軍力ノ比率ヲ決定スルト共ニ海軍軍備ノ基準ヲ低下スルノ協定ニ達セサルニ於テハ會議ハ其ノ目的ヲ失ヒ世人ニ與ヘタル希望ニ副ハサルニ至ルヘシ

軍備ノ基準及比率ハ華府條約ノ基礎ニシテ今次會議以前ニ於ケル且會議ノ準備的ナル交渉ノ目的タリシモノナリ當初ヨリ伊國全權部ハ右二點ニ他國全權部ノ注意ヲ喚起シタルカ右ハ會議ノ目的達成上緊要ナルノミナラス採擇スヘキ制限方式ノ決定ト密接ノ關係ヲ有スルモノト思考ス伊國全權部ハ會議カ現ニ之等ノ點ヲ考慮シツアルヲ知り欣幸トスルモノナリ右ニ關聯シ伊國全權部ハ「伊太利カ他ノ歐洲大陸ノ如何ナル國ヨリモ低カラサル限り如何ニ低キ數字ト雖モ之ヲ其ノ軍備ノ限度トシテ一應受諾スルノ用意アルコト」ヲ再言セント欲ス

伊國ノ地形ハ特ニ不利ナリ伊國ハ海ヲ國境トスルノ利益ナク其ノ存立ノ懸ル糧食ノ四分ノ三ハ海外ヨリ來ルモノナル處右ハ他國海軍根據地ヨリ短距離ニ於テ威嚇セラレ攻撃ヲ受ケ易キ貿易路ヲ通スルモノナリ加之伊國ハ何等地中海外ノ海軍根據地ヲ有セス是レ公海ニ於ケル商船保護ノ任務ヲ特ニ困難ナラシムモノナリ伊國ノ問題ハ其ノ存立ヲ確保スルノ問題ニシテ其ノ主權下若ハ勢力下ニ在ル遠隔ノ領土ヲ防衛スルノ問題ニ止マラサルナリ加之伊國ハ「ロカルノ」條約ノ署名國トシテ英國ト共ニ歐洲大陸ノ平和ヲ保證スル特殊ノ國際義務ヲ負擔セリ

伊國ハ一層大ニシテ且特殊ノ國防上ノ所要アルニ不拘其ノ軍備ノ權利ヲ自制センコトヲ受諾シ且歐洲ノ如何ナル國ヨリモ低カラサル限り如何ニ低キ數字ニモ其ノ軍備ヲ縮少スルノ用意ヲ有ス

伊國ハ極力海軍軍備ノ縮少ヲ支持ス蓋シ伊國ハ聯盟國トシテ將又不戰條約ノ署名國トシテ斯ル縮少ヲ右諸條約ノ當然ノ歸結ト考フレハナリ軍備ノ縮少ニ依リテコソ各國民ハ右諸條約ニ價值ヲ附シ居ルコトヲ表示シ得且其ノ與ヘタル誓約ニ忠實ナルコトヲ證スルナリ倫敦會議ニ參加セル國タルト否トヲ問ハス如何ナル國トノ間ノ武力的衝突モ伊國ノ確立セル海軍政策ノ夢想セサル所ナリ

二、伊國全權部ハ敍上ノ主義ヲ交渉ノ結果到達シタル現狀ニ適用シ之ヲ左ニ概説ス先ツ華府條約ノ規定スル艦船ヲ論シ次テ他ノ艦船ヲ論スヘシ左記ノ提議ハ一般の協定ノ規定ニ從フヘキコト勿論ナリトス

(イ) 華府條約ノ規定スル艦船

(1) 主力艦

華府條約ハ主力艦ニ對シ左ノ比率及總噸數ヲ定ム

	米	國	英	國	日	本	佛	國	伊	國
比	五		五		三		一、六七		一、六七	
噸數	五、二五〇〇〇		五、二五〇〇〇		三、一五〇〇〇		一、七五〇〇〇		一、七五〇〇〇	

右條約ノ下ニ於テ伊國ハ一九二二年ニ所有セル主力艦十隻保有ノ權利ヲ有シタリ伊國ハ進ンテ六隻ヲ廢棄シ代換セス殘餘四隻トナレリ加之一九二八年十月伊國ハ署名國カ一九三一年乃至一九三六年ノ期間ニ於テ起工ノ權利アル主力艦ヲ一九三六年迄建造ノ延期ヲナスヘキコトヲ提議セリ

伊國政府ハ華府ノ取極ヲ害スルコトナク右提議ヲ維持ス右提議ニ依ルトキハ伊國ハ一定期間其ノ割當十七萬五千噸中十萬五千噸ヲ起工セサルコトナルヘシ但シ他ノ署名國カ右提議ヨリ生スル義務ヲ受諾スルノ條件ニ服スヘキコト勿論ナリ

加之伊國ハ他國カ同意スルニ於テハ主力艦ノ廢止ニ對シ好意的ナル審議ヲナスノ用意ヲ有ス

(一) 航空母艦

比 率	米 國	英 國	日 本	佛 國	伊 國
噸 數	一三五、〇〇〇	一三五、〇〇〇	八一、〇〇〇	六〇、〇〇〇	六〇、〇〇〇

華府條約ノ下ニ於テ伊國ハ目下右六萬噸ノ數字迄建造スルノ權利ヲ有ス然レトモ伊國全權ハ歐洲大陸ノ最強國カ一定時ニ於テ現實ニ所有スル航空母艦噸數ヲ超エサルコトヲ約スルノ用意ヲ有ス

(二) 華府條約ノ規定セサル艦船

伊國全權部ハ華府條約ノ規定セサル艦船ニ付一定時ニ於テ最強歐洲大陸國ノ現實ニ所有スル總噸數ヲ超エサルコトヲ約スルノ用意ヲ有ス

前記ノ約定ハ伊國カ一定時ニ於テ最強歐洲大陸國ノ軍備ヲ超ユルノ可能性ヲ排除スルモノナリ加之右ハ伊國カ軍備ノ第一層ノ縮少ヲ妨害スルカ如キコト全然ナク却テ之ヲ助成スルモノナリ

伊國全權部ハ會議カ協定勢力ノ比率ヲ基礎トシ現實ノ縮少ニ同意スルニ於テハ一層廣汎ナル制限ノ方式ニ贊同スルヲ得

ルノ可能性ヲ排除セス目下ノ處伊國全權部ハ一九二七年四月壽府ニ於テナシタル提議ヲ維持ス右提議ハ伊太利カ他國ニ於テ同様ノ約定ヲ與フルコトニ贊スルニ於テハ少クトモ龍骨据付六ヶ月前建造スヘキ各艦ノ船體ノ主要寸法及主要武裝ノ性能ヲ通告スルノ用意ヲ有ストノ趣旨ナリ

特ニ潛水艦ニ關シ伊國全權部ハ伊太利ハ主力艦ノ廢止ヲ含ム海軍軍備ノ實質的縮少ヲ確保セラルルニ於テハ潛水艦ノ廢止ニ異議ナシトノ趣旨ノ聲明ヲ想起ス伊國全權ハ何レニスルモ潛水艦噸數ノ縮少セラレンコトヲ切望ス左記ノ表ハ華府條約ノ規定セサル艦船ニ於ケル歐洲三國ノ現在海軍力ヲ示スモノナリ該表ハ協定艦齡巡洋艦二十年驅逐艦十六年潛水艦十三年ヲ超エサル既成及起工済ノ一切ノ艦船ノ數字ヲ掲ク

八吋砲搭載巡洋艦

	英 國	佛 國	伊 國
既 成	隻數 噸數	隻數 噸數	隻數 噸數
一	一、〇〇〇	三	三、〇〇〇
二	三六、八〇〇	三	三〇、〇〇〇
三	四	三	四〇、〇〇〇
計	一五 一四六、八〇〇	六 六〇、〇〇〇	六 六〇、〇〇〇

六吋ヲ起ユル砲ヲ搭載スル他ノ巡洋艦

	英 國	佛 國	伊 國
既 成	隻數 噸數	隻數 噸數	隻數 噸數
四	三九、四二六	一	一三、八三〇*
二			二〇、九四〇*

六吋以下ノ砲ヲ搭載スル巡洋艦

既 成	英	噸數	佛	噸數	伊	噸數
	三九	一七七、六八五	七	四一、八七〇*	七	二八、九〇〇*
建 造 中	噸數	噸數	噸數	噸數	噸數	噸數
	三九	一七七、六八五	七	四一、八七〇	六	二九、六〇四
計	三九	一七七、六八五	七	四一、八七〇	一三	五八、五〇四

檣導驅逐艦及驅逐艦

一九二

嚮導驅逐艦及驅逐艦

巡洋艦	驅逐艦總計	英國		佛國		伊國	
		隻數	噸數	隻數	噸數	隻數	噸數
既成	一五〇	一五七、五八五	六〇	七〇、七三八	七八	七三、八一四	
建造中	二〇	二六、七八六	二一	四四、八六七	一一	一四、五八八	
計	一七〇	一八四、三七一	八一	一一五、六〇五	八九	八八、四〇二	

巡洋艦 驅逐艦總計

潛 水 艦	既 建 造 中	英	噸 數	佛	噸 數	伊	噸 數
	二 三 八		五 四 八、二 八 二	九 五	二 三 一、三 〇 五	一 一 〇	三 二 七、八 四 六
		英	噸 數	佛	噸 數	伊	噸 數
			五 三	四 四	三 一、九 八 四	四 三	二 七、二 六 三

潛水艦

既	成	英	噸	隻	噸	隻	噸	隻	噸
五三	四四、五三四	四四	三一、九八四	四三	二七、二六三	一〇	一四、七五〇	四七	四九、七八三
六三	六〇、二八四	九一	八一、七六七	五七	三七、〇八八	一〇	一四、七五〇	四七	四九、七八三
計	建	造	中	計	建	造	中	計	建
六三	六〇、二八四	九一	八一、七六七	五七	三七、〇八八	一〇	一四、七五〇	四七	四九、七八三

(*) 一九二二年以前ニ竣工セル艦船ニ對シテハ基準排水量ヲ用キスシテ普通排水量ヲ掲ケタリ、排水量ハ總テノ場合英噸ナリ

(20) 昭和五年三月五日米國全權聲明

右ハ米國全權部ハ會議ニ於ケル措置力軍備擴張ヲ指捺シタルモノナリナノ點ニ於テ特ニ聲明セラル
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AMERICAN DELEGATION, LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE.

For the press

March 5, 1930.

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION IN THE MORNING PAPERS OF
MARCH 6, 1930, EVERYWHERE.

NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN ANYWAY.

Statement of the Honourable Henry L. Stimson, Chairman of the American Delegation.

There seems to be an impression that the work of the American Delegation at this Conference is likely to result in an increase instead of a reduction in the tonnage of the navies of the world. The surest way to answer that is to give such results as seem to be within reach up to date. The plan which in its essentials appears to be acceptable to America and Great Britain provides for a net reduction in the tonnage of the whole American fleet, built, building or appropriated for, of over 200,000 tons, and an even larger reduction on the part of the British fleet. If vessels authorized but not commenced were included in existing fleets the amount of the reductions would be much greater.

Of course these reductions are contingent upon some reductions being made in the fleets of other Powers.

(21) 昭和五年三月十三日佛國全權聲明

昭和五年三月十三日附佛國全權聲明ハ佛國政府ハナニシテハナニ
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THE FRENCH MEMORANDUM.

Afternoon 13 March, 1930.

To avoid any of the misconstructions which have already arisen in the English press, the French delegation beg to specify their declaration of Feb. 13.

1.—Taking into account the new classification of exempt vessels, the present tonnage of the French fleet, as concerns ship in commission, building, or appropriated for, including special vessels, amounts to 670,861 tons.

2.—Should France undertake no further building on and after Jan. 1, 1931, the tonnage of the fleet in commission in 1936 would be 670,861 tons.

Should an agreement be made conformably with her declaration of Feb. 13:

3.—From 1931 to 1933 France would build 120,000 tons, i.e., 77,329 tons of replacement and 42,671 tons of supplementary building (the latter including 23,330 tons in replacement of the battleship France, lost in 1922, and 19,341 tons of actual supplementary building), the rest being entirely replacement tonnage.

Those 120,000 tons would be in commission in 1936, and the tonnage of the Fleet in commission would become, as soon as the scrapings anticipated had been made, 713,532 tons.

4.—From 1934 to 1936 France would build 120,000 tons of replacement, at the average rate of 40,000 per annum.

The French Delegation already specified on Feb. 12 that the tonnage thus built, which would be in commission after Dec. 31, 1936, would be entirely balanced by the scrapping of an equal quantity of over age tonnage.

On Dec. 31, 1939, as on Dec. 31, 1936, the tonnage of the ships in commission would therefore be 713,532 tons.

It was therefore without any ambiguity that M.J.L. Dumessnil, Minister of the Navy, speaking on behalf of the French Delegation, made his statement to M. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, in presence of Ambassador Dwight Morrow, member of the American Delegation.

13 Mars 1930.

NOTE AU SUJET DES DECLARATIONS DE LA DELEGATION FRANCAISE.

Pour éviter des erreurs d'interprétation, analogues à celles qui se sont déjà manifestées dans la Presse Anglaise, la Délégation Française croit devoir préciser ses déclarations du 13 Février.

1°—Compte tenu de la nouvelle classification des bâtiments non limitables, le tonnage actuel de la Flotte française en bâtiments en service, en construction ou votés, bâtiments spéciaux compris est de : 670.861 tonnes.

2°—Si la France n'entreprendait aucune construction nouvelle à partir de 1931, le tonnage de la Flotte en service 1936 serait de : 670.861 tonnes.

Si un accord se réalisait conformément à sa déclaration du 13 Février :

3°—De 1931 à 1933, la France construirait 120.000 tonnes dont 77.329 tonnes de remplacement et 42.671 tonnes de complément (le tonnage de complément se divisant en 23.330 tonnes de remplacement du cuirassé "FRANCE" perdu en 1922 et 19.341 tonnes de complément réel), le reste étant uniquement du remplacement.

Ces 120.000 tonnes seraient en service en 1936 et le tonnage de la Flotte en service deviendrait, les déclassements prévus ayant été effectués : 713.532 tonnes.

4°—De 1934 à 1936, la France construirait 120.000 tonnes de remplacement à l'annuité moyenne de 40.000 tonnes par an.

La Délégation Française a déjà précisé le 12 Février que le tonnage ainsi construit devant entrer en service après le 31 Décembre 1936, serait compensé par le déclassement d'une quantité équivalente tonnage vieilli.

Au 31 Décembre 1939, comme au 31 Décembre 1936, le tonnage des bâtiments en service resterait donc de 713.532 tonnes.

C'est donc sans ambiguïté que M. J.L. DUMESSNIL, Ministre de la Marine, parlant au nom de la Délégation Française, a fait ses déclarations à M. ALEXANDER, 1er Lord de l'Amirauté, en présence de M. l'Ambassadeur DWIGHT MORROW, Délégué Américain.

(22) 昭和五年三月二十六日「協議協定」ニ關スル米國全權聲明

米國國務省發表ノ會議集第三十六頁ニ據ル

DELEGATION PRESS STATEMENT, LONDON, MARCH 26, 1930.

Rumor was current last evening to the effect that the American Delegation had made a change of their attitude toward consultative pacts and were willing to enter into such a pact for the purpose of saving the conference. It was authoritatively denied at the headquarters of the American Delegation that any change had taken place in the attitude of the American Delegation, and its attitude remains as its spokesmen gave it out several weeks ago. At that time it was made clear that America had no objection to entering a consultative pact as such; on the contrary, the United States is already a party to a number of treaties involving the obligation of consulting with other powers. It will not, however, enter into any treaty, whether consultative or otherwise, where there is danger of its obligation being misunderstood as involving a promise to render military assistance or guaranteeing protection by military force to another nation. Such a misunderstanding might arise if the United States entered into such a treaty as a *quid pro quo* for the reduction of the naval force of another power. That danger has hitherto inhered in the present situation where France has been demanding mutual military security as a condition of naval reduction, as appears from her original statement of her case last December. If, however, this demand for security could be satisfied in some other way, then the danger of misunderstanding a consultative pact would be eliminated from an entirely different standpoint. In such a case the American Delegation would consider the matter with an entirely open mind.

(23) 昭和五年四月二日帝國全權聲明 (第一部三(48)ノ同イ)

(24) 昭和五年四月二日、日英米三國全權ノ態度ニ關ス

ル「リード」ノ聲明

米國國務省發表ノ會議集第三十六頁ニ據ル

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE HONORABLE DAVID A. REED,
LONDON APRIL 3, 1930.

I can't too strongly impress on you the fine spirit in which the Japanese and British have met us. There was no disposition to quibble on the part of any one of the three delegations. All three delegations have been frank and fair. I can't imagine a pleasanter negotiation than it has been. The result is not a victory for anyone, but an honorable and reasonable settlement between the three.

(25) 各國全權聲明書ヲ會議記錄中ニ編入方ニ關スル往復文書

Delegazione Italiana
alla
Conferenza Naval de Londra.

April 7th, 1930.

Dear Sir Maurice,

It has occurred to my Delegation that the memoranda issued some time ago by the five Delegations, setting forth the position of their respective Governments at the London Naval Conference, have not been, as yet, included in the official records of the Conference. My Delegation are of the opinion that, owing to their paramount importance, these documents should, no less than the data and suggestions contained in the L. N. C. series, form part of such official records.

I have, therefore, been directed to submit to you for the consideration of the other Delegations, the suggestion that the five memoranda (as well as the explanatory notes accompanying some of them) be printed together under the series number of L. N. C., and circulated by the Secretariat-General in the same way as the other documents.*

Hoping that our suggestion may be acceptable to the other Delegations, I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the text of the memorandum and explanatory notes, as issued by the Italian Delegation on the 19th February last. I should be very much obliged to you if you would kindly let me know at your earliest convenience what decision has been arrived at in this connexion.

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) D. ROGERI.

Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,
Secretary-General,
London Naval Conference,
St. James's Palace,
London, S.W.1.

117 海軍要略編纂

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1930.

Secretariat General,
St. James's Palace,
London, S. W. 1.

10th April, 1930.

My dear Sato,

I enclose herewith a copy of a letter dated April 7th, together with its enclosures, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the Italian Delegation, suggesting that certain Memoranda by the five Delegations which have already been published, setting forth the position of their respective Governments at the Conference, should now be circulated for inclusion in the official records of the Conference.

The United Kingdom Delegation, for their part, have no objection to the proposal, and I enclose a copy of the Memorandum, dated February 4th, 1930, already published as a Parliamentary Paper, which they would include in the official document. I should be glad to know the views of your Delegation on the proposal of the Italian Delegation. In the event of their concurring in it, I shall be grateful if you will let me have a copy of any document your Delegation would wish to include.

Yours very sincerely,

M. P. A. Hankey.

Naotake Sato, Esq.,
46, Grosvenor Square,
S. W. 1.

11011

三、我方返翰

My dear Sir Maurice Hankey,

11th, April, 1930.

In reply to your letter dated the 10th of this month, I have pleasure in informing you that the Japanese Delegation has no objection to the suggestion of the Italian Delegation with regard to the inclusion in the official records of certain Memoranda which have already been published.

I am, accordingly, sending you herewith enclosed a copy of the declarations made by this delegation on February 13th and April 2nd respectively.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd) N. Sato.

Secretary-General

Sir Maurice Hankey, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.

(26) 倫敦海軍會議ノ成果ニ關スル昭和五年四月十五日附

英國政府白書

昭和五年四月十日英海軍省ハ下記ニ於テ日英米三國協定成立ニ關シ聲明ス食ヲムカキ其條一ノ白書ヲ作成スノキ點ヲ列ス
本白書ハ四月十五日附ニ於テ發表セラル

MEMORANDUM ON THE RESULTS OF THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE FROM
JANUARY 21 TO APRIL 15, 1930.

London, April 15, 1930.

IN a memorandum on the position at the London Naval Conference, 1930, presented to Parliament on the 4th February last, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom took the view that if the strengths of national fleets were not to be a menace they must be the subject of international agreement, the purpose of which should be to maintain an equilibrium which should form the subject of agreements made from time to time by the Naval Powers. His Majesty's Government believed that, if such an agreed equilibrium could be established over a period of time, the sense of security of any Power would be increased, and one of the most fruitful sources of fear and friction would be removed. Meanwhile, Governments could be engaged in strengthening the foundations of peace and paying the way for further measures of disarmament.

Proposals for achieving the above were set out in the memorandum, and it will now be convenient to place before Parliament the measure of success which has been reached up to date at the London Naval Conference in giving effect to the aims of His Majesty's Government.

As regards capital ships, complete agreement has been reached between all the Powers represented at the Conference that they will lay down none of the replacement ships of 35,000 tons each which they were entitled to build, under the

11011

terms of the Washington Treaty, during the years 1931-36 inclusive. The British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States and Japan undertake to proceed at once with the reduction of their capital ships in numbers to 15, 15, 9 respectively, instead of waiting until the expiration of the Washington Treaty. France and Italy only reserve to themselves the right of constructing additional ships from the replacement tonnage which has been available for such use between the signature of the Washington Treaty and the present day, but which has not actually been used up to date.

As regards aircraft carriers, His Majesty's Government have not been able to obtain at this conference a modification of the total tonnage and displacement limits laid down in the Washington Treaty. It was agreed that this matter should be left over until a conference in 1935, but meanwhile His Majesty's Government's proposal that aircraft carriers under 40,000 tons should be included in the aircraft carrier category has been generally agreed to, and the further provision has been added that the gun armament for these particular vessels should not exceed 6 inches in calibre, instead of 8 inches.

As regards other classes of vessels, it has not been possible yet to reach an agreement embracing all the Powers represented at the Conference. His Majesty's Government will continue conversations with France and Italy in the hope of arriving at a satisfactory adjustment.

Meanwhile complete agreement has been reached between the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States and Japan on:—

- (a) the category system of limitation of capital ships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines,
- (b) the figures within these categories, and
- (c) the question of transfer between 6-inch cruisers and destroyers,

The figures for the agreement for cruisers, destroyers and submarines as between the three Powers are as follows:—

<u>British Commonwealth of Nations.</u>									
8-inch-gun cruisers	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	15 units	Tons. 146,800
6-inch-gun cruisers	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	192,200
<u>United States.</u>									
8-inch-gun cruisers	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	18 units	Tons. 180,000
6-inch-gun cruisers	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	143,500
Destroyers	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	150,000
Submarines	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	52,700
Total	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	526,200
<u>Japan.</u>									
8-inch-gun cruisers	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	12 units	Tons. 108,400
6-inch-gun cruisers	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100,450
Destroyers	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	105,500
Submarines	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	52,700
Total	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	367,050

The United States undertakes not to complete more than fifteen 8-inch-gun cruisers before 1935.

The United States has the option to rest on this figure and to make a corresponding increase in its 6-inch-gun cruisers from 143,500 to 189,000, in which case the total tonnage for the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations will amount to 541,700. If it does not choose to exercise this option it undertakes that its 16th 8-inch-gun cruiser will be laid down in 1933, its 17th in 1934 and its 18th in 1935. In that event Japan will be free to advance a claim at the Conference in 1935 for an increase in its 8-inch tonnage.

This section of the treaty, which will apply to the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States and Japan, will contain a clause safeguarding our position in relation to the building programmes of other Powers.

In addition to the above points affecting actual tonnage, a number of important decisions have been taken on the questions relating to the method of limiting and defining naval material of war. The rules which have been drawn up relate to the following subjects:—

The general principle of limitation (*i. e.*, a satisfactory compromise between the systems of global tonnage and limitation by categories); the definitions of the cruiser and destroyer; the unit size and armament of destroyers and submarines; the definition of exempt vessels, special vessels and aeroplane carriers; the rules for scrapping and replacement; the definition of displacement tonnage; and the prohibition of the construction of vessels which do not conform to Treaty limitations.

It has not been found possible to reach agreement on the abolition of the submarine, but as regards the three Powers a total submarine tonnage figure which shall apply equally to each of them has been arrived at, and His Majesty's Government has been able to insert a figure for destroyer tonnage which is appropriate if related to the three Signatory Powers, and is less by 50,000 tons than the figure of 200,000 tons referred to in the White Paper of 4th February last. It must be noted, however, that the figure of 150,000 tons of destroyers for the British Commonwealth of Nations must be conditional on an agreed destroyer and submarine strength of the European Powers represented at the London Conference. This will be the subject of further negotiations with the Powers concerned.

Further, although the submarine remains as a combatant naval vessel, an important agreement has been reached by all five Powers strictly limiting its use, and ensuring its compliance to the rules generally recognised to be applicable to all surface vessels. This is not so drastic as the Washington instrument, but the latter treaty, though ratified by us, never received the requisite unanimous ratification.

The immediate financial saving resulting from the conference is the avoidance of expenditure for the replacement of battleships under the Washington Treaty. But for this agreement, before the end of 1936, Great Britain would, under the Washington Treaty, have completed five new 35,000-ton ships and would have had a further five appropriated for and under construction. This might have necessitated an expenditure in the region of £50,000,000 up to the end

of 1936. Further, the financial saving involved in reducing at once to 15 capital ships is estimated at about £4,000,000.

As regards cruisers, destroyers and submarines, the United States, Japan and the British Commonwealth of Nations have overcome the difficulties which resulted in the failure of the Geneva Conference in 1927. The final British proposal at that conference was for a combined total tonnage of cruisers, destroyers and submarines, including over-age vessels, of 737,500 tons. The comparable total agreed upon to-day is 541,700 tons. On a conservative basis we have been saved a further expenditure in these classes of ships of some 13 million sterling.

Important as are these financial savings, a yet more important result of this first stage of the London Conference has been the elimination of competitive building in cruisers and auxiliary craft between the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States and Japan, with all that this implies in the mutual improvement of their political relations. The figures of the agreement between those Powers have been placed at a low level and it is the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that during the next stage of the conference agreement may be reached with the French and Italian Governments at levels which will permit of their programmes and tonnage figures being incorporated in the agreement already reached between the other Powers.

After the signature of the treaty the Conference will adjourn in order to give further time for negotiations between the French and Italian Governments, with a view to the settlement of difficulties which as yet prevent a complete agreement. These negotiations may be prolonged, and it is unnecessary that the Delegations from distant countries, which are not so immediately concerned, should remain in London while the conversations are proceeding; it is for this reason that an adjournment has been decided upon.

London, April 15, 1930.